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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no doctrine in patent law is as controversial1 as the Doctrine of
Equivalents (DOE),2 a common law creation that allows a court to expand
patent scope beyond the rights literally claimed in the patent.3 Despite nearly
1. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (Rader, J., concurring) (“Few problems have vexed this court more than articulating discernible
standards for non-textual infringement.”); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1472
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., dissenting from Order declining suggestion for rehearing in banc) (“There
is perhaps no question more important to the health of patents than the scope and application of the
judicially-created doctrine of equivalents.”); Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of
Patent Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 123 (2000) (calling the
doctrine of equivalents “the most difficult and least predictable of all doctrines in patent law to apply”).
2. Throughout this Article, we refer to the Doctrine of Equivalents as the “DOE” or simply the
“doctrine.”
3. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“The doctrine of equivalents expands the reach of claims beyond their literal language.”). The
claims of a patent define the metes and bounds of the patent owner’s right to exclude; thus, technically,
it is perhaps more accurate to state that the DOE expands the statutory right to exclude, not necessarily
the claims themselves. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Giles S. Rich, Forward to DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW at vi (3d ed. 2004). The doctrine of equivalents interacts with patent claim language to establish
the exclusionary rights granted by a patent. A patent owner enjoys the right to exclude others from
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two hundred years of development,4 patent law lacks a coherent vision of a
doctrine that holds great intuitive appeal.5 Debate about the proper contours of
the DOE is formal and unsatisfying because the doctrine lacks a strong
normative foundation. This Article supplies a rigorous justification for the
DOE that explains when it should apply and why its application should be “the
exception . . . not the rule.”6
The traditional justification explains that the DOE prevents “an unscrupulous
copyist” from skirting patent claim language by making insignificant, yet
non-infringing, changes in the technology.7 This fairness theory seems to be
loosely based on a Lockean notion that an inventor should be justly rewarded
for her labors.8 One version of the fairness theory treats the DOE as a cure for
mistakes by the Patent Office that improperly limit patent scope.9 Another
making, using, and selling the invention that it claimed in the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
Infringement of these rights is judged initially by asking whether the defendant’s activities fall literally
within the scope of the patent claims. A defendant who does not literally infringe still may be liable for
infringement under the DOE if its product or process is equivalent to the product or process claimed by
the patent owner. Thus, the doctrine serves strictly to expand the rights of the patent owner.
4. See infra Part I.A and accompanying notes.
5. The most recent example of the emotional force of the DOE is reflected in the seven filed
opinions in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en
banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002); see also Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine
of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 681
(1989) (describing wide swings in Federal Circuit treatment of the doctrine of equivalents during the
first decade of the court’s existence). The competing policies between the clear claim requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) and the DOE are extensively set forth in the additional opinions of Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 940–75 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The patent bar strenuously
opposed the restriction on the DOE imposed by the Federal Circuit in Festo. Patent attorneys felt the
court disrupted settled expectations linked to a generous doctrine of equivalents and modest role for
prosecution history estoppel. The absolute bar chosen by the Federal Circuit forced changes in patent
prosecution practice that disrupted established practices of the patent bar. More cynically, both patent
prosecutors and patent litigators profit from a vigorous doctrine of equivalents. Broad patent scope
obtained through the doctrine of equivalents raises the expected value of patents and hence demand for
patent prosecution. Uncertainty created by the doctrine increases the probability of patent disputes and
the demand for the services of patent litigators.
6. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
7. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating
the “doctrine . . . ‘temper[s] unsparing logic and prevent[s] an infringer from stealing the benefits of an
invention’”) (quoting Graver Tank); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950) (adopting Judge Hand’s “unsparing logic” language); Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.) (noting that courts “resort to the ‘doctrine of
equivalents’ to temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the
invention”).
8. See, e.g., Nelson v. Batson, 322 F.2d 132, 135 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting “the degree of protection
afforded beyond the language of the claims will vary directly with the value of the inventor’s
contribution to the art”) (citing Royal Typewriter); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent
Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 201 (2002) (noting but not endorsing
the view that the doctrine of equivalents “is justified on the grounds that it better reflects the intellectual
contribution of the inventor”); Scott P. Zimmerman, Hughes Aircraft and the Warner-Jenkinson
Presumption: The Certiorari That Should Have Been, 40 IDEA 131, 133 (2000) (stating the “doctrine of
equivalents evolved so that an inventor’s contribution to society is protected against insubstantial
changes falling outside the literal terms of the patent claim”).
9. See infra Part I.C.1 and accompanying notes.
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version treats the DOE as a way to reverse the unjust enrichment of a competitor who profits from the patent and does little or nothing to advance the
technology.10
Recent decisions have moved away from a deontological fairness theory
because it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s insistence that patent law
has a utilitarian foundation.11 Unfortunately, the courts have not replaced the
fairness theory with a new normative account that explains when and how the
DOE contributes to social welfare. What began as an equitable doctrine designed to correct unjust copying now has an expanded but ill-defined role in the
patent system. To the extent that a modern justification for the doctrine can be
inferred, it apparently starts with the belief that the patent system generally
works to give inventors patent claims with the proper breadth, but sometimes
frictions in the system cause patent claims to be too narrow.12 The proper role of
the DOE is to overcome these frictions and restore the proper breadth. We label
this justification the friction theory.
The friction theory offers various explanations of why an inventor fails to
obtain the full breadth of rights she was entitled to during the patent application
process (known as patent prosecution). The most common explanation asserts
that the “inherent limitations of language” prevent patent prosecutors from fully

10. This version is consistent with Graver Tank and its progeny. See, e.g., Applied Materials, Inc. v.
Advanced Semiconductors Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that the
DOE prevents competitors from making “unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in
the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim,
and hence outside the reach of law”) (citing Graver Tank).
11. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34–35 (1995) (implying that
the DOE was utilitarian, and rejecting the notion that the doctrine was purely equitable). The preamble
to the intellectual property clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, “To promote the
progress of the . . . useful Arts,” is expressed in utilitarian terms and has been interpreted as such during
the twentieth century. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information,
and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 59 (2001) (noting that “the basic ideological commitment of American
intellectual property is actually heavily utilitarian, not Lockean or Hegelian”); Linda R. Cohen & Roger
G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 453, 453–61 (2001)
(asserting that “the conceptual model underlying American intellectual property law is utilitarian: rights
are granted for social objectives (advancing knowledge and producing useful products)”). Nevertheless,
the fairness rationale holds continuing appeal. See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that “the doctrine of equivalents operates to ‘prevent an infringer from
stealing the benefit of an invention’”); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stressing the need to balance “fairness to inventors lest the patent be unjustly
circumvented, against the purpose of patent claims to state clear boundaries of the patent grant”). For a
discussion of the dominant fairness orientation of the courts in the nineteenth century, see infra Part I.A
and accompanying notes.
12. The patent code reflects the underlying assumption that applicants receive proper claim scope
from the PTO (or claim scope to which the applicants were entitled), but “who had for some reason
failed to claim complete protection for their discoveries.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). This assumption is found in the reissue provisions
of the patent code, which allow patentees to broaden claim scope due to their good faith error, not the
PTO’s error. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 163, 201 (explaining that
commentators treat policy toward the DOE as a question of optimal patent scope).
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claiming an invention.13 Other explanations point to mistakes by the patent
prosecutor,14 and future developments in complementary technology that are
not foreseen at the time of patent prosecution.15
The friction theory suffers from three main weaknesses. First, the theory is
implausible on empirical grounds. The frictions that supposedly block proper
claim breadth are missing from the leading cases. Second, there is not a
convincing answer to the question of why the doctrine of equivalents, rather
than some other doctrinal approach, should be used to overcome the frictions.
The frictions can be overcome, or at least mitigated, for example, by astutely
amending claims during prosecution; a more aggressive use of continuation
practice, and request for continuing examination; through a reissue proceeding
after the patent issues;16 or through artful claim drafting as an initial matter.17
Third, proponents of a far-reaching DOE fail to pay adequate attention to the
notice function of patent claims and are insufficiently sensitive to patent law’s
delicate incentive dynamic.18
We develop a better explanation of why claim breadth falls short of the
maximum breadth allowed by patent law. Our explanation replaces the passive
prosecutor depicted in the friction theory with active inventors and prosecutors
who are capable of responding effectively to the frictions identified above.19
Patent law allows an inventor to claim the embodiments of the invention she
actually achieved before application, and any other embodiments she enables
through the disclosure provided in the patent. The enablement standard requires
that a person having ordinary skill in the art be able to make and use the
embodiments claimed in the patent without undue experimentation.20 Some
inventors do not claim everything they have enabled because they do not know
or cannot (or did not) articulate everything they have enabled. Whether an
inventor obtains the broadest permissible claim breadth depends mostly on the
talent and effort of the inventor and prosecutor in identifying what has been

13. See infra Part I.C.2 and accompanying notes.
14. See infra Part I.C.1 and accompanying notes.
15. See infra Part I.C.3 and accompanying notes.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); see also infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part II.A (discussing drafting techniques).
18. We believe the second and third problems can be addressed and a plausible friction theory can be
developed, but limits to language and other frictions are usually not a significant impediment to
effective claim drafting, and the friction theory should have only a secondary role in developing patent
policy toward the doctrine of equivalents.
19. Wagner argues that patent law should pay attention to the incentives it creates for patent
prosecutors. His analysis differs from ours because it focuses mostly on the prosecution history
estoppel doctrine, and on the incentive of inventors to disclose information (an adverse selection
problem in the jargon of economics). See generally Wagner, supra note 8; see also F. Scott Kieff, The
Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45
B.C. L. REV. 55, 109–10 (2003) (noting the negative effect of the DOE on the incentive to draft high
quality patent claims). Our broader study of the DOE focuses mostly on the incentive of inventors to
gather information through refinement (a moral hazard problem in the jargon of economics).
20. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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enabled.21 The frictions facing inventors and prosecutors are no more vexing
than similar problems facing attorneys who deal with other complex legal
problems. A good patent agent or attorney predicts the embodiments that could
be chosen by infringers and finds appropriate language to draft a suitably broad
claim. This task is quite familiar to transactional lawyers—identifying relevant
contingencies.
We believe that inventors fail to obtain the full claim breadth to which they
are entitled because they fail to refine their claims sufficiently during patent
prosecution.22 We define refinement as the process of identifying and claiming
the broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled by the disclosure in the
patent specification. Managers and researchers from the inventor’s firm often
join the inventor and the patent prosecutor in the refinement process. They work
together to visualize strategies that third parties might use to imitate the
invention.23 Refinement efforts work to uncover alternative versions of the
inventor’s original embodiment, alternatives made possible by substituting
equivalent elements for a structure in a product invention or a step in a process
invention. The patent prosecutor then revises the claims to include these newly
identified embodiments.24 A profit-maximizing patent applicant stops refinement when the marginal costs of refinement (from legal fees and the implicit
21. This message was strongly implied in recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court DOE and
prosecution history estoppel decisions. Cases such as Festo, Warner-Jenkinson, and Johnson &
Johnston reveal a policy of devolution of responsibility from the courts and PTO to the inventor and her
attorney.
22. We use the term “prosecution” to include the filing of continuation and continuation-in-part
(“CIP”) applications. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53 (2005); PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 201.07 & 201.08 (8th
ed. 2001, rev. 2005). Continuation and CIP applications are commonly employed to claim further
refinements and improvements discovered after the original filing date. An important distinction
between a continuation and a CIP is that the latter allows an applicant to add broadening new matter. In
addition to filing a continuation or CIP application, refinement may continue beyond prosecution and
include the first two post-issuance years when it is possible to broaden the language in a patent claim
through reissue. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
23. We use the term imitation as the act of taking the teaching of the patent (or the portion not
protected by patent law) to develop technology outside the literal scope of the patent claims, which, in
our model, is embodiment F. See infra Part III.A. Commentators and courts often use the phrase
“inventing around” the same way we use imitation. Imitation differs from refinement because the third
party only needs to find one non-infringing embodiment, but he must also develop the embodiment so it
can actually be used. A patent applicant does not have to develop embodiments in order to claim them;
she only needs to enable the embodiments. Thus, refinement may be more costly than imitation because
of the effort required to enumerate a long list of embodiments. On the other hand, imitation may be
more costly because of development costs. See id.
24. At the same time, applicants revise claims to exclude prior art that gets identified during
prosecution. Under the new matter doctrine, revisions to the written description that occur after an
application is filed may jeopardize the priority date derived from that application. Thus, prosecutors
should strive to finish revision of the written description before filing. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v.
Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The new matter doctrine prevents an
applicant from adding new subject matter to the claims unless the specification shows that the inventor
had support for the addition at the time of the original filing.”). The purpose of the new matter doctrine
is to assure that the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing. The
written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 also serves this function. Importantly, an
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cost of the effort of the inventor and others) equals the marginal benefit (from
stronger patent claims).25
Our theory, which we label the refinement theory, offers a compelling description of patent claiming and a social-welfare justification of the DOE.26 According to the refinement theory, the DOE creates a social benefit by allowing patent
applicants to avoid certain refinement costs during patent prosecution. The
theory also reveals the limits that should be imposed on the doctrine. A socially
optimal patent policy should balance refinement cost savings and innovation
incentives created by the DOE against the harm to competition and rent-seeking
costs created by the doctrine.27
This Article contains four parts. In Part I, we trace the history of the DOE,
highlighting its early reliance on fairness justifications and the transition to
utilitarian justifications consistent with the friction theory. In Part II, we explain
that while the friction theory adequately explains the rationale in recent DOE
cases, it fails to provide a satisfactory justification for many of the leading DOE
cases such as Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson. We also recount the frustration felt by the Federal Circuit as it took ad hoc measures to constrain a bloated
DOE. Although the court has failed to articulate a persuasive justification for the
DOE, it has identified three reasons to limit application of the doctrine. First,
the DOE displaces the judgment of the Patent Office and the Federal Circuit,
and substitutes the judgment of the fact finder at trial regarding the breadth of
patent rights.28 Second, the uncertainty about patent rights created by the

applicant faced with a new matter or written description rejection may respond by filing a CIP
application.
25. There may also be costs relating to traditional research and development because the refinement
efforts of the inventor, patent attorney, and management may well lead to additional development
activity. Thus, refinement and development are distinct but connected. As discussed in note 122, supra,
continuation and continuation-in-part applications are commonly used to claim additional embodiments
resulting from refinement and development.
26. Some Federal Circuit case law suggests our approach. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E.
Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring) (“[T]he patentee has
an obligation to draft claims that capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention. The
doctrine of equivalents would not rescue a claim drafter who does not provide such notice.”); Sage
Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]s between the patentee
who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is
the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its
claimed structure.”). And the Supreme Court’s recent Festo decision is consistent with this line of
reasoning. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
27. The doctrine can also be justified on process grounds. Arguably, courts should be allowed to
expand claim scope at trial because the passage of time and the adversarial nature of the proceeding
gives them better information than the earlier ex parte proceeding at the PTO. See Douglas Lichtman,
Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 177–78 (2004); Kieff, supra note 19,
at 72–73. Furthermore, a relatively small fraction of patents matter to competitors, see Mark Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500–08 (2001), thus perhaps it
makes sense to delay careful consideration of patent scope until trial.
28. This point was made by Justice Campbell in his dissent in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 330 (1853) and by Justice Black in his dissent in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). See infra Part I.B.
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doctrine undermines the notice function of the patent.29 Potential competitors
have a difficult time competing aggressively by using technology that is adjacent to the technology controlled by the patent owner. And third, uncertainty
promotes opportunistic and anticompetitive patent lawsuits.30
Part III presents the refinement theory within an economic model of invention
and patent prosecution. The model contains a single potential inventor/patentee
and a single potential competitor. The inventor moves first and decides whether
to try to invent E, a set of embodiments of a patentable invention. If an
invention occurs, the inventor can draft a patent that claims E or she can make a
further investment to refine her understanding of the invention and draft a
broader patent that claims E plus an additional set of embodiments F. The set F
can only be obtained after E. If the inventor obtains E but not F, then the
competitor has a chance to develop an embodiment in F and use the embodiment in competition with the inventor.
We incorporate a stylized version of the DOE in the model and compare
equilibrium outcomes with and without the doctrine. Under the DOE, the
inventor simply claims E and has the right to exclude the competitor from
making and using any embodiment in E or F; thus, the doctrine allows the
inventor to avoid literally claiming F and incurring the cost of refinement. In
contrast, in the version of the model without the DOE, the inventor must pay
refinement costs and literally claim F to get protection over the embodiments in
F.
The model demonstrates the social costs and benefits of the DOE. When
refinement costs are high, social value arises from the DOE because it provides
an important incentive to inventors, and because it promotes efficient investment in refinement. When refinement costs are low, the DOE offers neither of
these benefits, and thus should be curtailed to increase certainty and decrease
rent-seeking. Although critics of the DOE contend that the doctrine unduly

29. See, e.g., Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(emphasizing the importance of patent law’s notice function); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “the patentee cannot be
allowed to recapture the excluded subject matter under the doctrine of equivalents without undermining
the notice function of the patent”); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 29 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.”).
30. As Judge William Bryson noted in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1996):
Patent counselors should be able to advise their clients, with some confidence, whether to
proceed with a product or process of a particular kind. The consequences of advice that turns
out to be incorrect can be devastating, and the costs of uncertainty—unjustified caution or the
devotion of vast resources to the sterile enterprise of litigation—can be similarly destructive.
See also Winans, 56 U.S. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (“Nothing, in the administration of this law,
will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust
pretensions and vexations demands, more injurious to labor, than a relaxation of [the clear claim
requirements].”); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003).
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inhibits competition, surprisingly, we show that often the degree of competition
is unaffected by the presence or absence of the DOE. The inventor can block
competition in the absence of the DOE by investing in refinement and drafting
broad patent claims. We call this “preemptive” refinement because its sole
purpose is to preempt competition. Preemption tends to be socially harmful
because the inventor controls the embodiments in E and F under either regime;
and society loses the value of the refinement costs paid by the inventor to deter
competition in the regime without the DOE.31
We apply these results to policy issues in Part IV. We begin by embracing the
reissue proceeding as an alternative to the DOE. Reissue, which allows patentees to broaden their claims within two years of issuance, is an under-utilized
proceeding that has many of the advantages of the DOE with relatively few of
its drawbacks. Thereafter, we explain when pioneer patents should get more
generous protection under the DOE. We reject the standard explanation that
reasons that claim drafting is harder for pioneer patents. We argue instead that
the DOE provides a valuable boost to the incentive to invent a pioneering
technology that offsets the combined costs of invention and refinement.
In addition, we reject the popular notion that the DOE is especially appropriate in the case of unforeseeable, later-developed technology because this justification focuses on the wrong question. The label “unforeseeable” confuses the
analysis because, in fact, there are gradations of foreseeability; some laterdeveloped technologies are more and some are less foreseeable. The question
should not be whether the technology is foreseeable; rather the question should
be how difficult is it to identify embodiments and write a claim that covers
them? Under our refinement theory, the DOE is inappropriate when refinement
costs are low vis-à-vis later-developed technology. It must seem counterintuitive
to non-patent lawyers that refinement costs could be low, but often patent
applicants can capture unforeseen embodiments through greater conceptual
effort and the use of various claim drafting strategies.32 Application of the DOE
to later-developed technology can be justified only as a means of discouraging
excessive investment in refinement. In other words, the doctrine should be used
to block socially wasteful expenditures when inventors find it profitable to exert
considerable effort identifying and claiming later-developed embodiments simply to preempt entry by a competitor. Surprisingly, this rules out application of
the DOE to startlingly new equivalents, because these types of equivalents are
conceptually unattainable no matter the amount of time and money spent on
refinement efforts. Patent applicants would not refine their claims to cover these
equivalents, and inventors’ incentives are not much affected by a minute
probability of loss of effective patent protection.
Finally, we analyze three doctrines that constrain the DOE: the all-elements

31. But preemption may be socially desirable when the embodiments in F are quite differentiated
from the embodiments in E, and society values diversity highly. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
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rule, the public dedication doctrine, and prosecution history estoppel. The
all-elements rule has the desirable effect of preserving the narrow scope of
patents in fields crowded with prior art. Thus, this rule works to complement the
rule favoring application of the DOE to pioneers. Similarly, a disclosure that
trips the dedication doctrine reveals a low refinement cost. And we defend a
rigorous prosecution history estoppel doctrine because amendments or arguments made during patent prosecution often show that the refinement cost is
low to literally claim patent scope sought through the DOE.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS: FROM FAIRNESS TO FRICTION
A. THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF PATENT LAW SHIFTS FROM FAIRNESS TO EFFICIENCY

Two related notions of fairness have dominated legal thought about patents
for much of the history of American patent law. First, an inventor deserves a
property right in her invention as a reward for her labor.33 And second,
competitors should not unjustly enrich themselves by using a patented invention
without permission.34 Nineteenth century judges, particularly during the first
half of the century, construed patent law “benignly in favour of patentees,”35
and viewed the inventor as having a natural property right in his invention.36

33. A Lockean “just desert” theory holds considerable influence in intellectual property theory,
particularly in Europe. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J.
287 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). Although the “just desert” rationale is
reflected in antebellum patent cases, American patent law is firmly grounded in notions of utilitarianism. See Benkler, supra note 11, at 59 (noting that the “basic ideological commitment of American
intellectual property is actually heavily utilitarian, not Lockean or Hegelian”).
34. Theories of corrective justice that focus on unjust enrichment also play an important role in
intellectual property theory. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property
and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
35. Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1082–83 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585) (stating that
“congress have declared the intention of the law to be to promote the progress of the useful arts by the
benefits granted to inventors; not by those accruing to the public, after the patent had expired, as in
England”); see B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 81 (2005) (stating “[n]umerous reported decisions
before the early courts clearly and repeatedly declared that patent rights were ‘sacred’ and to be
regarded as the just recompense to inventive ingenuity”); EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE
PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 244 (1998)
(noting that William Thornton, the Superintendent of Patents from 1802 to 1828, “like many of his
contemporaries . . . viewed the patent system not so much as being embued [sic] with a public interest,
but rather as a mechanism for rewarding legitimate inventors and protecting their rights”).
36. Catherine Fisk writes that, during the nineteenth century, the notion that an inventor had a
property right in his idea “was so widely accepted as to seem a matter of natural right.” Catherine L.
Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor,
1830–1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1142 (1998). The natural rights justification was also used by
courts as a basis for justifying patent term extensions, not only at the behest of inventors, but also his
assignees or heirs. As the court in Brooks v. Bicknell stated:
The same reason that would give a renewal to the patentee, would be equally strong in behalf
of his heirs. If the term of the original grant had not given an adequate remuneration for “the
time, ingenuity, and expense” of the patentee; on every principle of public policy, in the event
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Modern notions relating to the public domain and the social costs of patents
were not well formulated, and thus did not moderate the goals of serving and
rewarding inventors. For instance, Justice Story, the leading patent law jurist of
the century, stated, “[t]he inventor has . . . a property in his inventions; a
property which is often of very great value, and of which the law intended to
give him the absolute enjoyment and possession.”37 Accordingly, he expressed a
reflexive hostility toward free-riders: “let the damages be estimated as high, as
they can be, consistently with the rule of law on this subject, if the plaintiff’s
patent has been violated; that wrong-doers may not reap the fruits of the labor
and genius of other men.”38
But by the mid-nineteenth century, there were signs of judicial recognition of
the public costs associated with exclusive rights. As one court noted, these
“sacred rights of genius and property . . . should be maintained in a manner not
harsh towards other inventors, nor unaccommodating to the growing wants of
the community.”39 A good example of this cautionary turn is O’Reilly v.
Morse,40 an infringement action brought by Samuel Morse.
Morse sued to protect his right to his telegraph invention. There were eight
claims in Morse’s patent; the first seven claimed various telegraphy processes.
In the eighth claim, now famous in the annals of patent law, Morse stated that
he did “not intend to limit” himself “to the specific machinery” set forth in the
specification and the other seven claims. Rather, he sought protection for the
“essence” of his invention, which was the use of “electro-magnetism, however
developed, for making or printing intelligible characters or signs, at any distances . . . .”41
The Supreme Court invalidated claim eight as “too broad” because Morse
sought “an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when
he obtained his patent.”42 The Court faulted Morse for not upholding his end of
the bargain with the public, namely his duty to teach the public how to make

of his decease, there should be a renewal for the benefit of his heirs. That a man should be
secured in the fruits of his ingenuity and labor, is a sound maxim of the common law.
4 F. Cas. 247, 251 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1944).
37. Ex parte Wood, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824).
38. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); see also Blanchard v.
Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1518) (Story, J.) (noting that “[p]atents . . . are
clearly entitled to a liberal construction, since they are not granted as restrictions upon the rights of the
community, but are granted ‘to promote science and useful arts’”).
39. Woodworth v. Edwards, 30 F. Cas. 567, 570–72 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 18,014). Morton
Horwitz observed a shift in the perception of monopolies during this time, noting that “[t]hough earlier
grants of monopoly privileges may have been necessary in an underdeveloped society in order to
promote private investment, the restrictive consequences of these grants were becoming apparent by the
second quarter of the nineteenth century.” MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780–1860, at 130 (1977).
40. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id. at 113.
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and use what he sought to claim in claim eight. And significantly, the Court
stressed the costs of overly broad claims to future inventors and the public:
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march of
science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of
the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or
combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be less
complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expensive in construction,
and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could
not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this
patentee.43

Another important Supreme Court mid-century case is Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,44 or what has come to be known as the “doorknob case.” The invention
in Hotchkiss related to an old method of making doorknobs whereby the
doorknob had a certain shaped hole for the fastening of a shank. The only
difference was that the inventor substituted a clay or porcelain knob for a
metallic knob. Although the invention was new, the Court declined the patent,
stating that:
The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity and invention . . . ; for
unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the
shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or
porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with
the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity, which
constitute essential elements of every invention.45

The Hotchkiss case is widely regarded as creating an additional patentability
hurdle, above and beyond novelty and utility, which required an inventor to
display “more ingenuity and skill” than that possessed by the “ordinary mechanic.”
While Morse and Hotchkiss can be viewed as placing constraints on patent
scope and raising the level of inventive contribution, the post-1836 judicial
attitude toward patents remained quite positive,46 and continued to emphasize

43. Id.
44. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
45. Id. at 266.
46. Indeed, the Morse case must be kept in context. The main question before the Court was whether
Morse was the “first and original inventor” of the telegraph and whether O’Reilly’s use of the
Zook-Barnes Columbian telegraph infringed Morse’s patent. The Court, in a thirty-seven page opinion,
found that Morse’s inventive efforts antedated those of Davy, Steinheil, and Wheatstone and that the
Zook-Barnes Columbian telegraph infringed Morse’s patent because the former was substantially
similar to Morse’s claimed invention. Thus, while the invalidation of claim eight denied Morse a total
victory, he not only won on infringement and was declared the first original inventor of the telegraph,
but he subsequently secured a seven-year patent term extension for his patent. See KENNETH SILVERMAN,
LIGHTNING MAN: THE ACCURSED LIFE OF SAMUEL F.B. MORSE 320–24 (2003).
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notions of fairness.47 In fact, one year after Morse, the Supreme Court decided
the first significant DOE case, Winans v. Denmead.48 As we explain below, the
dissent in Winans was uneasy about the social costs of broad patent scope, but
the majority was strictly concerned with the fair treatment of the inventor, and
punishing the putative unscrupulous behavior of the infringer.49
By the late nineteenth century, however, the favorable attitude toward patents
and the heroic inventor receded and courts voiced greater skepticism of patents
as rewarding not the hard labor of the inventor, but rather, the scheming of
would-be monopolists.50 For example, in Atlantic Works v. Brady,51 Justice
Bradley recognized that patent law calls for a utilitarian balancing of social
costs and benefits. He agreed that the patent laws were designed to benefit
inventors “who make some substantial discovery,” but contended that patents on
“every trifling device . . . tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention”
and “creates a class of speculative schemers who . . . lay a heavy tax upon the
industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement
of the arts.”52
Moreover, the economy became more industrialized and the inventive process more complex. Inventors increasingly became employees and carried on
their inventive endeavors under the auspices of their employers, which in turn
gave rise to ownership disputes between the employer and the employeeinventor. In these ownership disputes, the courts, while remaining sympathetic
to the inventor, gave employers greater rights in the invention. Many scholars
have argued that by focusing on the public costs associated with patent grants
and by granting the employer greater control in the invention, the late nine-

47. During this time, the judicial perception of the inventor as heroic genius took hold. See Fisk,
supra note 36, at 1135, 1161 (“Patent law . . . adopted the Romantic notion of the individual as the
inventor or originator of an idea, and turned it into a legal category that supported a whole system of
property rights . . . . The popular understanding of the hero-inventor’s importance in the Industrial
Revolution permeated the discourse of patent law . . . throughout the nineteenth century.”). For a
discussion of the “heroic inventor” in American patent law, see Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17
HIGH TECH. L.J. 899, 904–22 (2002). For a British perspective on this motif, see Christine MacLeod,
Concepts of Invention and the Patent Controversy in Victorian Britain, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:
METHODS AND THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 137–53 (Robert Fox ed., 1996). See generally
ROGER BURLINGAME, MARCH OF THE IRON MEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF UNION THROUGH INVENTION (1938).
Several scholars have disputed the heroic inventor narrative. See, e.g., S.C. GILFILLAN, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF INVENTION 77 (1935) (“The popular belief in individual, single, great inventors for things has been
grotesquely developed by the same process as that which built all the classic mythologies to account for
the origins of this and that, so that our traditional great inventor . . . are still . . . mythic heroes in our
school-propagated national epos.”). But see JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 12 (1990) (asking “is it not possible to go too far in the other direction and
give too little credit to major inventions made by a vital few?”).
48. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
49. See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
50. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 380 (1973) (“Toward the end of the
[nineteenth] century, the courts seemed to become keenly aware that a patent could be used to stifle
competition [and] [t]hey became quite stingy with preliminary injunctions against infringement.”).
51. 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 192 (1883).
52. Id. at 200.
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teenth century courts began to turn away from a natural rights justification for
patents, and adopted a utilitarian approach that focused on efficiency and
economic development.53
B. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AND THE LINGERING INFLUENCE OF
FAIRNESS CONCERNS

During the twentieth century, courts shifted largely to an economic understanding of the patent system.54 But fairness concerns continued to dominate thinking
about the doctrine of equivalents.55 In fact, the Federal Circuit has reiterated
that the doctrine was “judicially devised to do equity.”56 Some courts advocate
the DOE as a means to block the unjust enrichment of “unscrupulous copyists”
who avoid patent claims by incorporating “colorable differences” into the
infringing technology.57 Other courts see the DOE as a means of fully and fairly
rewarding inventors for their labors, regardless of whether the defendant behaved badly.58
53. See Fisk, supra note 36, at 1162–63; WALTERSCHEID, supra note 35, at 18 (asserting that in the
late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, patent law was “perceived to be primarily for
the purpose of rewarding inventors with public benefits accruing only incidentally to this primary
purpose . . . . The modern view that ‘[t]he patent law is directed to the public purposes of fostering
technological progress’ would have been almost completely foreign”).
54. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (noting the patent system promotes
progress by offering an exclusive right as an incentive to innovate); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (stating the patent system must balance innovative incentives
against the costs of monopoly).
55. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“The doctrine of equivalents, of common law origin, serves to prevent a ‘fraud on the patent.’”); Pall
Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (the DOE “serves to guard
against ‘fraud on a patent’ by enabling fair protection of the patentee’s contribution” (citation omitted));
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he doctrine
of equivalents is designed . . . to relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket when equity
requires.”).
56. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(“[I]n doctrine of equivalents cases, this court’s allusions to equity invoke equity in its broadest
sense—equity as general fairness.”), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). The court maintained
this view from its creation. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The
doctrine of equivalents is designed to protect inventors from unscrupulous copyists.”); Int’l Visual
Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that the court has
emphasized the equitable nature of the DOE).
57. The archetype case for this line of reasoning is Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (“[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not
copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless
thing. Such a limitation would leave room for—indeed encourage—the unscrupulous copyist to make
unimportant and insubstantial changes.”). The issues raised in Graver Tank and the Court’s rationale
continue to resonate today. See, e.g., Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (DOE serves the equitable purpose of “prevent[ing] an infringer from stealing the
benefit of an invention”). Emphasis on anti-social behavior by the defendant potentially could affect the
scope of the DOE, but the Supreme Court recently rejected a role for intent in the doctrine. See
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997) (“Application of the doctrine
of equivalents . . . is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent.”).
58. See, e.g., Nelson v. Batson, 322 F.2d 132, 135 (9th Cir. 1963) (stating the “purpose of the
doctrine of equivalents is to give the inventor an opportunity to secure a just reward for his invention”).
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A brief history of the DOE will bring out some of the finer points of the
doctrine and allow us to convey various fairness arguments developed in
support of the doctrine. The exact date of the creation of DOE is difficult to
discern because the role of claims in patents has changed over time. The
doctrine works to expand patent scope beyond the rights given by the claims,
thus there could not be a DOE until rights were firmly associated with claims.
Claims were not mentioned in the Patent Act of 1793;59 they first appear in the
1836 Act.60 Prior to the 1836 Act, however, patent attorneys as a norm began to
include claim-type language in the patent specification.61
To understand why this norm developed, one must appreciate that in the first
half of the nineteenth century, courts helped inventors gain broad patent scope
by setting generous standards for patent infringement—a precursor to the
DOE.62 Early patent cases63 fleshed out the inchoate patent right by focusing on
the “principle” of the invention. These decisions used such equitable language
as “colorable differences,”64 “copyist,” and “pirated,”65 and created linguistic
59. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
60. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). See generally William R. Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755 (1948); Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of
Claims of U.S. Patents (Part I), 20 PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134 (1938).
61. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 S. CT. REV. 273, 309–10.
62. For example, Circuit Justice Marshall stated that “the constitution and law, taken together, give
to the inventor, from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is completed by
suing out a patent.” Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564); see also Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 520
U.S. 17 (1997); on remand, 114 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Courts have applied the doctrine of
equivalents to protect the substance of the patentee’s right to exclude since the first few decades after
enactment of the Patent Act of 1790 . . . .”). Significantly, patent applications were not examined under
the 1793 statute, thus non-literal patent infringement was analytically similar to contemporary nonliteral copyright infringement. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 970 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (Newman, J.) (noting that “[d]etermination of equivalency is not unlike determination of
substantial similarity in copyright law”). Many infringement cases focused on the “principle” of the
invention as highlighted by the patent claim and adopted equitable language such as “colorable
differences” or “substantial identity” to gauge infringement. See cases cited infra note 64.
63. From 1804 through 1835 there were sixty-eight reported patent cases, ten of which were handed
down by the Supreme Court. Remarkably, of the fifty-eight reported lower court cases, forty were
written by Justices Bushrod Washington and Joseph Story, two Supreme Court justices riding circuit.
64. See, e.g., Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (Story, C.J.)
(“Mere colorable differences, or slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the original inventor.”);
Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 921 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1047) (Story, C.J.) (“Slight or colorable
differences will not protect the defendants in their infringement, or defeat the right of the patentee.”);
see also Sloat v. Spring, 22 F. Cas. 330, 334 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 12,948A) (“Mere colorable
alterations, or adroit evasions by substituting one mechanical equivalent for another in the combination
which constitutes the machine, should never be allowed to protect a party.”).
65. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Reeves, 3 F. Cas. 638, 640 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 1515) (Grier, C.J.)
(“We can not shut our eyes to the fact that the defendants have pirated the invention of the complainant
in all its essential parts. Whether the changes made constitute an improvement of the plaintiff’s
machine we need not inquire.”); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 728 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107)
(Story, C.J.) (“Of course, if either machine is new, and is the invention of Wyeth, and it has been
actually pirated by the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain a suit therefore . . . .”).
The notion of copying and piracy implies intent on the part of the defendant. The relevance of intent,
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tests such as “substantially the same”66 or “substantial identity”67 to gauge
infringement. During litigation, the jury would peruse the written description to
determine the principles underlying the inventive concept. The jury, however,
had the difficult job of comparing the accused product with the patentee’s
disclosed invention because the jury was required to discern abstract principles
of the invention from the patent document’s textual description and schematic
representations. As such, jurors may “find no infringement because they see so
many superficial differences between the defendant’s machine and the description of the patented invention.”68 Therefore, according to John Duffy, the claim
was developed by the patent bar to provide guidance for jurors as to the
patentee’s invention and “to call attention to what the inventor considered the
salient features of his invention.”69

however, has been discounted recently by the Supreme Court. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997). Cf. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 609 (1950) (recognizing the importance of known interchangeability).
66. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 176 (1852) (“[T]he test of infringement is, whether the
defendants have used substantially the same process to produce the same result . . . .”).
67. The use of the word “substantially” in the context of patent infringement can be traced to the
1817 cases of Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5718) and Lowell v. Lewis,
15 F. Cas. 1018, 1021 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). In the former, Circuit Judge Washington charged
the jury that discerning differences in principle between two machines can be difficult, “[b]ut we think
it may safely be laid down as a general rule, that where the machines are substantially the same, and
operate in the same manner, to produce the same result, they must be in principle the same.” 10 F. Cas.
at 1016. In Lowell, Circuit Justice Story instructed the jury that “whether the defendant has violated the
patent-right of the plaintiff . . . depends upon the fact, whether the pumps of Mr. Perkins and of Mr.
Baker are substantially the same invention. I say substantially the same invention, because a mere
change of the form or proportions of any machine cannot, per se, be deemed a new invention.” 15 F.
Cas. at 1021; see also Wilson v. Barnum, 49 U.S. 258, 261 (1850) (“It is a question as to the substantial
identity of the two machines”); Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 41–42 (1929)
(“There is a substantial identity, constituting infringement, where a device is a copy of the thing
described by the patentee, ‘either without variation, or with such variations as are consistent with its
being in substance the same thing.’”); Van Hook v. Wood, 28 F. Cas. 1007, 1007 (C.C.N.Y. 1844) (No.
16,855) (“But supposing the proof establishes the substantial identity of the two machines, the fact of
infringement, I think, is fully made out by the complainant.”).
68. Duffy, supra note 61, at 309.
69. Id. In this regard, John Duffy notes that the claim was created “to protect and to expand the
rights of patentees.” Id. at 308; see also RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 3 (1949) (contending that
nineteenth century claims “served merely to call attention to what the inventor considered the salient
features of his invention”). Central claiming was so common that when the Patent Act of 1836 was
passed, it was “understood as merely codifying the existing law which had been developed by the
courts.” Lutz, supra note 60, at 143.
The word “claim” found its way into the 1836 Patent Act and as a result assumed greater importance.
Nevertheless, the claim was still not regarded as the central feature of the patent document, even though
applicants began to draft claims more specifically by expending a “great deal of effort . . . in
formulating claims, and the practice grew of presenting a profusion of claims of varying form and
scope.” Woodward, supra note 60, at 764. In 1870, Congress, for the first time, specifically required the
patent applicant to claim his invention distinctly and with particularity. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230,
§ 26, 116 Stat. 198, 201 (1871). This new requirement, which came to be known as “peripheral
claiming,” highlighted the notice function of the claim and provided the applicant with more autonomy
in setting forth the outer boundaries (periphery) of his invention. The public, it was thought, would now
have more confidence about where the patentee’s proprietary boundaries reside because peripheral
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In Odiorne v. Winkley,70 one of the earliest cases to focus on the “principle”
of the invention, the owner of a patent for cutting and heading nails, although
conceding “there were some differences in the structure and operations” between his invention and the accused product, brought an infringement action.71
Circuit Justice Story noted that “[m]ere colorable differences, or slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the original inventor.”72 As such, the jury was
instructed that the patent would be infringed if “the machines used by the
defendant are substantially, in their principles and mode of operation, like the
plaintiff’s machines.”73
As the prominence of claims increased, the equitable standards for non-literal
patent infringement coalesced into the doctrine of equivalents. Instead of searching for the principle of the invention, courts gradually shifted to a two-part
analysis: first, interpret the claims and look for literal infringement; and second,
expand patent rights as required by equitable considerations. The 1853 landmark decision Winans v. Denmead74 established the parameters of the DOE
debate that remain applicable today. The patentee, Winans, developed a railroad
car for carrying coal. This car, “in the form of a frustum of a cone,” allowed for
far greater load bearing capacity than the typical box-shaped cars. The defendants, “‘in view for a call for cars from the mining roads near Cumberland,’”75
dispatched their draftsman, a Mr. Cochrane, “to get up a car that would suit their
purposes.”76 After Cochrane visited Winans’ shop where he “examined and
measured” a model car built by Winans, the defendants built a railroad car
having the same weight and material as plaintiff’s, differing only in shape.
Whereas Winans’ cars were cylindrical and conical, the defendants’ cars were
octagonal and pyramidal.77

claiming reduced the need for the DOE. Central claiming was officially dead, and the patent claim from
1870 to the present day has held center stage. See, e.g., Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876)
(asserting that the claim is of “primary importance” in ascertaining exactly what is patented).
70. 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
71. Id. at 582.
72. Id.
73. Id. One year before, in Park v. Little, 18 F. Cas. 1107, 1107–08 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 10,715),
the plaintiff owned a patent for alarm bells that were attached to fire engines. The defendant, who also
attached alarm bells to a fire engine, argued, inter alia, that its bells were based “on an entirely different
principle from those of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1108. In instructing the jury regarding the relevant issues,
Circuit Justice Washington stated: “Are the defendants’ bells an improvement in the principle or in the
form? If the former, then it is no invasion of the plaintiff’s privilege—if the latter, it is.” Id. It is a basic
tenet of patent law that an improvement of an invention claimed in an extant patent may itself be
patented, yet also infringe the earlier patent. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843–44 (1990) (asserting “the law should
attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for improvements, rather than an environment
dominated by the pioneer firm”).
74. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853). The first opinion to use the phrase “doctrine of equivalents” is
McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 402, 405 (1857).
75. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 332 (1853).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The plaintiff requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that in determining
infringement, similarity of form is less important than whether the “‘defendants
. . . constructed cars which, substantially, on the same principle and on the same
mode of operation, accomplished the same result.’”78 The judge refused and
essentially limited the scope of Winans’ invention to conically-shaped railroad
cars79—a position that would be received warmly by today’s Federal Circuit.80
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed and held that the jury
instruction prayed for by Winans was appropriate.81 The majority accepted the
notion that the claims play the primary role in determining patent scope, but
also insisted on a general role for equitable considerations that could expand
patent scope.82 Essentially, the Court incorporated earlier caselaw relating to the
“principle of the invention” into its developing doctrine of equivalents.83

78. Id. at 334.
79. The Circuit Justice instructed the jury as follows:
That while the patent is good for what is described therein; a conical body in whole or in part,
supported in any of the modes indicated for a mode of sustaining a conical body on a carriage
or truck, and drawing the same, and for those principles which are due alone to conical
vehicles and not to rectilinear bodies; and it being admitted that the defendant’s car was
entirely rectilinear, that there was no infringement of the plaintiff’s patent.
Id. at 336.
80. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc).
81. The Court noted that the “first part” of the jury instruction was nearly verbatim with the jury
instruction given in the English case of Walton v. Potter & Horsfall, 1 Webs. Pat. Cas. 585, 587 (1841).
But whereas the Walton tribunal asked the jury if the defendants “availed themselves of the plaintiff’s
invention,” the Winans Court went further and created the “same principle” test.
82. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 332–33 (1853). According to the Court:
There being evidence in the case tending to show that other forms do in fact embody the
plaintiff’s mode of operation, and, by means of it, produce the same new and useful result, the
question is, whether the patentee has limited his claim to one out of the several forms which
thus embody his invention. Now, while it is undoubtedly true, that the patentee may so restrict
his claim as to cover less than what he invented, or may limit it to one particular form of
machine, excluding all other forms, though they also embody his invention, yet such an
interpretation should not be put upon his claim if it can fairly be construed otherwise, and this
for two reasons: 1. Because the reasonable presumption is, that, having a just right to cover
and protect his whole invention, he intended to do so. . . . 2. Because specifications are to be
construed liberally, in accordance with the design of the Constitution and the patent laws of
the United States, to promote the progress of the useful arts, and allow inventors to retain to
their own use, not any thing which is matter of common right, but what they themselves have
created.
Id. at 341.
83. For example, the Court said:
The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured if the public is at liberty to make
substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions. And, therefore, the patentee, having
described his invention, and shown its principles, and claimed it in that form which most
perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to claim every form in which his
invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim some of those forms.
Id. at 343.
Cases following Winans continued to expand the scope of the patent to protect the principle
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The principle embodied in Winans’s invention was not the conical shape of
the car, but a shape that increased the volume of the car given a fixed surface
area.84 Justice Curtis, stated:
[T]he moment a practical, scientific man is furnished with the idea of giving
to the car a shape which will . . . enable him to make lighter in proportion to
its load, than it has ever been made before, he can multiply without end the
forms in which this principle can be made to operate. He can make the car a
polygon of a hundred sides, of twenty sides, or of eight sides. He can vary the
angle of the cone, or pyramid, through which the coal is discharged, ad
infinitum. . . . Still the question must always be, whether, whatever the shape
he adopts, he is not availing himself of the principle first suggested by the
patentee. . . . Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look
at the form only. Where they are separable; where the whole substance of the
invention may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of courts and juries
to look through the form for the substance of the invention.85

In addition to the fact that Cochrane “examined and measured”—implicitly
copied—plaintiff’s invention, the Court was influenced by the defendant’s
insignificant inventive contribution, which was a mere change in the form of the
patentee’s car. Such a minor change, according to the Court, is the “work of a
constructor, not of an inventor.”86 To permit such a defendant to escape infringement by asserting that the patentee only recited one form in his specification
would render the property of inventors “valueless.” The Court said little about
how or why patent scope should be expanded beyond the claims, but we infer
notions of fairness were critical to this inquiry. We reach this inference because

underlying the invention. See, e.g., Nat’l Cash Register Co. v. Boston Cash Indicator & Recorder Co.,
156 U.S. 502, 517 (1895) (“While the details of the defendant’s machine are quite different from that of
the plaintiff, the underlying principle . . . is precisely the same.”); Consol. Safety-Valve Co., v. Crosby
Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157, 178 (1885) (“When the ideas necessary to success are made
known, and a structure, embodying those ideas, is given to the world, it is easy for the skillful mechanic
to vary the form by mechanism which is equivalent, and is, therefore, in a case of this kind, an
infringement.”); Ives v. Hamilton, 92 U.S. 426, 428–29 (1875) (“One machine is the same in substance
as another if the principle be the same in effect, though the form of the machine be different.”).
84. The Court described the “eminent advantages” of the Winans’s car as follows:
[The patentee’s railroad car] increased the available power of the locomotive engine, looking
to revenue on coal as a freight, from 50 to 100 per cent. were to be attributed to the peculiar
shape of the car body, consisting of a frustum of a cone, which permitted the use of iron, as
thin as has been described, lessening, in proportion, the weight of the car, or the weight, the
transportation of which by the locomotive gave no return in revenue.
Winans, 56 U.S. at 332.
85. Id. at 336, 343; see also Blanchard v. Reeves, 3 F. Cas. 638, 639 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 1515)
(Grier, C.J.) (“[I]t is impossible to enumerate, in a specification, all the various modes by which the
machine may be made to operate, so as to produce a useful result. Many of its parts may be changed or
substituted by other mechanical equivalents or devices, which either improve or deteriorate its value,
while the original idea, principle, or mode of operation of the inventor is manifestly preserved.”).
86. Winans, 56 U.S. at 341.
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the Court focuses on the merit of the inventor and the bad motives of the
defendant, rather than the consequences of its decision.
Writing for the dissent was Justice Campbell,87 who argued that the text of
Winans’ patent confined his right to the conical form. In language that foreshadowed modern concern about the costs of uncertainty created by the DOE,
Justice Campbell remarked:
The patentee is obliged, by law, to describe his invention, in such full, clear,
and exact terms, that from the description, the invention may be constructed
and used. . . . Nothing, in the administration of this law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and
unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a
relaxation of these wise and salutary requisitions of the act of Congress.88

The drama of Winans was replayed nearly one hundred years later in Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.89 The Supreme Court
ruled against a defendant who made a composition that infringed a patent
covering a welding flux. The defendant did not literally infringe because its flux
contained an ingredient that was missing from the relevant claims.90 The court
applied the DOE because the defendant’s extra ingredient was a known substitute.91 The arguments marshaled by the majority and dissent in Graver Tank
echoed the jousting between Justice Curtis and Justice Campbell. Reminiscent
of Winans’ “valueless” language, the Graver Tank majority warned that suppressing the DOE would “convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and
useless thing” that would be at the mercy of the “unscrupulous copyist.”92
The role of the patent claim as guidepost had become increasingly important
87. Joining the dissent was Chief Justice Taney, who was no stranger to the nuances of patent law
and the concerns engendered by too generous a reading of a patentee’s proprietary scope. Justice Taney
wrote the majority opinion in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
88. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1853).
89. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). The story of Graver Tank has been told many times. See, e.g., Paul Janicke,
Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver Tank, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1996); Arthur Swanson,
Discussion of Application of Doctrine of Equivalents in Graver Tank v. Linde Case, 33 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 19 (1951).
90. The claim at issue covered a flux used in electric welding. The patent claimed a combination of
an alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride. The accused flux contains calcium fluoride,
calcium silicate (an alkaline earth metal silicate), and manganese silicate (which is not an alkaline earth
metal silicate). Thus, there was no literal infringement. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611–12.
91. The Court emphasized that one ingredient might be considered the equivalent of another. A
chemist skilled in this art would know of the interchangeability of manganese silicate for an alkaline
earth metal silicate. Evidence of interchangeability was found in publications and patents. The accused
compound was substantially identical in operation and result to the claimed compound. The Court
concluded the differences “colorable only.” Id. 339 U.S. at 612.
92. Id. at 617. The Court famously wrote:
One who seeks to pirate an invention . . . may be expected to introduce minor variations to
conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type
of infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and
would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention
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by the time Graver Tank was decided. In fact, for some time prior to the
decision, patent applicants no longer set forth their claims within the crowded
specification as Winans did; rather, claims were placed at the end of the patent
document. The specification remained an important interpretive guide, but it
was relegated to a secondary role and remains there today.93 Perhaps for this
reason, the majority began its analysis by noting that “[i]n determining whether
an accused device or composition infringes a valid patent, resort must be had in
the first instance to the words of the claim.”94 The dissent would have stopped
with those words.
Dissenting Justice Black embraced a utilitarian view of the DOE and warned
of the social cost caused by straying too far from a patent’s claim language.95
He found the balance of equities favored the defendant: “I heartily agree with
the Court that ‘fraud’ is bad, ‘piracy’ is evil, and ‘stealing’ is reprehensible. But
in this case . . . petitioners are not charged with any such malevolence . . . .”96
He argued the DOE should be limited to cases in which the differences between
the accused compound and the claims are insignificant. Like Justice Campbell
in Winans, he feared that the uncertainty engendered in broad application of the
DOE created a grave threat to competition.97
C. THE MODERN FRICTION THEORY

In 1997, the Supreme Court finally brought the DOE into conformity with
modern patent law by rejecting a fairness rationale in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.98 The Court disallowed a “judicial exploration of
the equities of a case before allowing application of the doctrine of equivalents,”99 and ruled that intent plays no role in the doctrine’s application.100

and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the
primary purposes of the patent system.
Id.
93. See ELLIS, supra note 69, § 3 (“The idea that the claim is just as important if not more important
than the description and drawings did not develop until the Act of 1870 or thereabouts.”). Judge Giles
S. Rich, one of the two most influential twentieth century patent law jurists, famously quipped, “the
claim is the name of the game.” Kieff, supra note 19, at 102.
94. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
95. Id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 612–13.
97. Id. at 617 (“Hereafter a manufacturer cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims. He
must be able, at the peril of heavy infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed
in a particular technological field will expand the claim’s language after considering the testimony of
technical experts in that field. To burden business enterprise on the assumption that men possess such a
prescience bodes ill for the kind of competitive economy that is our professed goal.”). Moreover,
Justice Black argued the DOE raises separation of powers concerns because Congress “entrusted the
Patent Office, not the courts, with initial authority to determine” claim scope, and Congress created a
reissue proceeding that the DOE seems to render irrelevant. Id. at 615.
98. 520 U.S. 17, 34–35 (1997).
99. Id. at 34.
100. Id. at 36. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the DOE is an equitable doctrine that should
be applied by the court. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether the judge or jury should apply
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Surprisingly, after rejecting the fairness rationale, the opinion, while discussing
the proper form for the test of DOE, failed to advance a positive justification for
the doctrine.101 Five years later, the Court, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,102 hinted that the DOE should be justified in terms of the
friction theory:103
If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be
greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by
simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the
most efficient rule.104

We infer from this language that the doctrine is justified as an efficient response
to frictions present in the claims drafting process. The DOE responds to these
frictions to restore proper patent scope and provide the appropriate incentive to
create and disclose inventions. The three main sources of friction are prosecution errors,105 the “frailties of language and limitations on human foresight.”106
1. Prosecutorial Mistakes
Mistakes committed when drafting and prosecuting a patent before the PTO
are the first source of friction. Patent prosecutors have long viewed the DOE as
a safety net available to mitigate the effect of their mistakes.107 By responding
to mistakes, the doctrine substantially overlaps with the function of the reissue
proceeding.108 A reissue proceeding allows a patentee to return to the PTO to
the DOE, but it commented favorably on the Federal Circuit’s view that the jury should apply it. See id.
at 37–39.
101. Id. at 39–40.
102. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
103. In its opening paragraph, the Court seemed to revert to a fairness theory when it wrote, “a
patent protects its holder against efforts of copyists to evade liability for infringement by making only
insubstantial changes to a patented invention.” Id. at 727.
104. Id. at 731–32.
105. See supra Part I.C.1 and text accompanying notes 95–97.
106. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see supra
Parts I.C.2–3.
107. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 5, at 711 (“Most frequently, patent holders use the
doctrine of equivalents to rectify what is effectively a ‘mistake’ in the process of drafting and
prosecuting the application in the PTO. The patent holder argues that the failure to include something in
the claim was an oversight.”); Paul M. Janicke, When Patents are Broadened Midstream: A Compromise Solution to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. CINN. L. REV. 7, 42 (1997) (same); cf.
In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“An attorney’s failure to appreciate the full scope of
the invention is one of the most common sources of defects in patents.”).
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000), which reads in relevant part:
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or
partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of
the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall,
on the surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee required by law, reissue the patent
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correct mistakes, including drafting too narrowly, that were made in good faith
during a prior prosecution.109 The reissue proceeding has been around since at
least 1832,110 and it was codified in 1836.111
2. Limitations of Language
The Supreme Court particularly emphasized the limitations of language in
Festo, stressing language’s “imperfect fit for invention” and noting that the
“doctrine of equivalents is premised on language’s inability to capture the
essence of innovation.”112 By way of elaboration, the Court quoted the following passage from Autogiro Co. of America v. United States:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of
drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention

for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended
application, for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. No new matter shall be
introduced into the application for reissue.
Id.; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing relationship between reissue and DOE).
Importantly, the rationale for reissue is grounded on the notion that patent drafting is a difficult
endeavor, replete with pitfalls. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892):
To hold that a patent can never be reissued for an enlarged claim would be not only to
override the obvious intent of the statute, but would operate in many cases with great hardship
upon the patentee. The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at
all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy;
and, in view of the fact that valuable inventions are often placed in the hands of inexperienced
persons to prepare such specifications and claims, it is no matter of surprise that the latter
frequently fail to describe with requisite certainty the exact invention of the patentee, and err
either in claiming that which the patentee had not in fact invented, or in omitting some
element which was a valuable or essential part of his actual invention.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a) (2005) (requiring a general statement that errors involved no deceptive
intent).
109. 37 C.F.R. § 1.175. Notably, a mistake for reissue purposes does not include subject matter
“previously surrendered in order to obtain allowance of original patent claims.” Mentor Corp. v.
Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429,
1436 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The recapture rule bars the patentee from acquiring, through reissue, claims
that are of the same or of broader scope than those claims that were canceled from the original
application.” (emphasis omitted)).
110. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832).
111. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
112. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734, 738 (2002); see
also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 624 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Linn,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The problems . . . regarding the inherent limitations of
language . . . have provided justification for the lengthy history of applying the doctrine of equivalents
to all claim language to adequately protect the patentee’s right to his invention . . . .”); Joseph S.
Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30–31 (1997)
(“Implicit in the recognition that literal infringement alone is sometimes inadequate to protect the
patentee is the recognition that the literal claim language did not fully capture the patentee’s contribution to the art. . . . The inability of language to accurately capture the invention is one type of
information cost that the doctrine of equivalents is used to overcome.”).
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is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always
keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of
words, but words for things.113

3. Unforeseen Technical Developments
The third source of friction arises from the difficulty foreseeing technical
developments relevant to the patented technology.114 Accordingly, patent prosecutors are not expected to claim unforeseeable equivalents. While notions of
foreseeability are present in some older cases, in 1997, the Federal Circuit made
foreseeability a crucial factor in its DOE analysis:
[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader
claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must
bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of
its claimed structure. . . . This court recognizes that such reasoning places a
premium on forethought in patent drafting. Indeed this premium may lead to
higher costs of patent prosecution. However, the alternative rule—allowing
broad play for the doctrine of equivalents to encompass foreseeable variations, not just of a claim element, but of a patent claim—also leads to higher
costs.115

And the Supreme Court solidified the role of foreseeability in Festo:
The patentee, as the author of the claim language, may be expected to draft
claims encompassing readily known equivalents. A patentee’s decision to
narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended
claim. . . . There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The equivalent
may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application . . . .116

113. 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (quoted in Festo, 535 U.S. at 731). Interestingly, the court
focused on the inventor’s vocabulary and verbal acumen. While it is proper to think of patents as
technical documents, they are almost invariably written by patent attorneys, especially litigated patents.
114. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that doctrine of
equivalents expands claim scope to cover unanticipated equivalents). The enablement requirement is
relaxed in the context of later-developed technology. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (“To now say that appellants should have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on this
record did not exist until 1962, would be to impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the
patent system.”); Adelman & Francione, supra note 5, at 714–15 (“In the ‘new technology’ context, the
patent cannot teach the actual enablement, which becomes possible only as the result of technological
development. . . . Whether a broad claim that would cover both the original teachings and the new
technology would be enabled would then depend on the predictable or not predictable nature of the art
to which the invention pertains.”).
115. Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
116. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740; see also Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A.
Lemley, Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1066–68 (2001) (recounting
support for the foreseeability approach in the case law).
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II. A NEW PERSPECTIVE: FROM FRICTION TO REFINEMENT
A. THE FALSE PREMISE OF THE FRICTION THEORY

The modern justification of the DOE rests on the flawed assumption that
certain inventors are blocked from claiming the full scope of their inventions by
exogenous frictions. The three types of friction discussed above are all plausible; but treating them as exogenously fixed is not. Limits of language,
problems of foreseeability, and the risk of mistake can be mitigated through the
efforts of the inventor and her patent prosecutor.117 We concede there are cases
in which no amount of effort would overcome these frictions, but we think such
cases are unusual—and certainly not represented by the leading DOE cases.118
The exogeneity premise is most clearly wrong in the case of mistakes.
Inventors can reduce the likelihood of mistakes by spending more time and
money on prosecution, choosing a prosecutor with a good reputation, and
effectively monitoring the prosecution.119 The DOE should not offer routine
relief for mistakes because such a policy undercuts the incentive of the inventor
117. Empirical evidence consistent with our view comes from John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley,
Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004). They show that
litigated patents differ significantly from other patents. Specifically, they cite more prior art than
non-litigated patents, and contain more claims. Assuming more valuable inventions tend to get litigated
more, and patent prosecutors understand which inventions are more valuable, this result suggests
prosecutors are sensitive to economic forces which influence the content of a patent. Kieff notes that
inventors selectively invest varying amounts and intentionally choose varying quality levels for their
patent applications. See Kieff, supra note 19, at 101–02.
Moreover, in a recent English patent case, Lord Hoffmann addressed the issue of claim drafting and
non-literal infringement. He wrote:
The conventions of word meaning and syntax enable us to express our meanings with great
accuracy and subtlety and the skilled man will ordinarily assume that the patentee has chosen
his language accordingly. As a number of judges have pointed out, the specification is a
unilateral document in words of the patentee’s own choosing. Furthermore, the words will
usually have been chosen upon skilled advice.
Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 34 (U.K.).
118. As Lord Hoffmann wrote in this regard, “[t]here will be occasions upon which it will be
obvious to the skilled man that the patentee must in some respect have departed from conventional use
of language or included in his description of the invention some element which he did not mean to be
essential.” Yet he noted that “one would not expect that to happen very often.” Kirin-Amgen, [2004]
UKHL46, ¶ 34.
119. Jay Thomas suggests that it may be difficult for the market to evaluate the ability of patent
prosecutors. See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the PostMarkman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 168 (2005). We are not aware of any empirical evidence
on this point, but we doubt that evaluating the reputation of patent prosecutors differs very much from
other markets for professional service.
Thomas also worries that restriction of the DOE will cause social harm because of increased patent
drafting costs. Id. at 167–68. This is a reasonable concern especially since many patents are not
commercially exploited or are allowed to lapse due to a willing failure to pay maintenance fees. See
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents (George Mason Law & Economics, Research Paper No. 04-29,
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract⫽566941. Nevertheless, the increased drafting costs
must be weighed against the social benefit from better-drafted patents. Thomas argues this benefit is
small. We address that argument infra note 197. Furthermore, it is possible that overall or collective
drafting costs might decline as firms decide to prosecute fewer patents.
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(or her assignee) to invest in a high quality application and ignores the statutory
reissue provision.120 The Federal Circuit appears to be moving toward this
view.121
The Federal Circuit also shows some awareness that the other frictions can be
smoothed over,122 but progress on this front has been slowed by some disappointing signals from the Supreme Court. For instance, the Court in Festo wrote
approvingly about the application of the doctrine in Winans and Graver Tank,123
despite the likelihood that the patentees in those cases could have overcome the
relevant frictions rather easily. If the Festo Court had a better appreciation of
the possibilities for crafting claims to mitigate language and foreseeability
problems, we think it would have shared our doubt about the correctness of the
outcome in Winans and Graver Tank.
Recall that the patentee in Winans developed an improvement in the shape of
railroad cars for transportation of coal and other materials.124 He claimed that
the body of his car is “in the form of a frustum of a cone”—that is, a cylindrical
or conical form. The accused product employed an octagonal form. The majority, in applying the DOE, noted that “it is undoubtedly true that the patentee
may restrict his claim as to cover less than what he invented . . . yet such an
interpretation should not be put upon his claim” because the “reasonable
presumption is, that so having a just right to cover and protect his whole
invention, he intended to do so,” and because “specifications are to be construed
liberally” consistent with the Constitution.125
The dissent grasped the notion that a patent applicant can overcome prosecution frictions. Justice Campbell observed the patentee, in drafting his claim,
“overlooked those facts which reduced its practical value to the level of cars of
a form widely verient [sic, variant] from his own” and that the “object of this

120. See supra text accompanying notes 108–11.
121. See PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“The patentee, rather than the public, must bear the burden of inadvertent errors in the patent—
including inadvertent dedications.”); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court and applying prosecution history estoppel to block the
DOE when the patent specification mistakenly disclosed a protein with 166 amino acids instead of
165).
122. See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“No subtlety
of language or complexity of the technology, nor any subsequent change in the state of the art, such as
later-developed technology, obfuscated the significance of [the] limitation at the time of its incorporation into the claim.”); Vehicular Tech. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1383–84 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did
not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of his failure to seek
protection for this foreseeable alteration of his claimed structure.” (citing Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at
1425)).
123. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734, 732–33 (2002); see
also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25–26 (1997) (reaffirming Graver
Tank).
124. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 332 (1853).
125. Id. at 341.
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suit is to repair that defect of observation.”126 He concluded the patentee must
have excluded other forms “advisedly.”127 Essentially, Justice Campbell recognized claim language is malleable and most frictions could be overcome with a
reasonable effort. The patentee could have claimed any number of shapes, and
despite the claims of the majority, it makes little sense to say the patentee
intended to claim other forms when those forms were easy to discern.
In Graver Tank, the patent pertained to certain electric welding compositions
known as fluxes, which facilitated the fusing of metals. Two sets of original
claims were involved. One set of claims described a major element as any
“silicate.” The other set of claims, which were narrower, described the element
as any “alkaline earth metal silicate.” The Supreme Court held the first set of
claims invalid for undue breadth. The narrower claims were upheld, and the
question became whether those claims were infringed. The alkaline earth metal
silicate claims included magnesium silicate. The accused product substituted a silicate
of manganese, which is not an alkaline earth metal, for magnesium silicate.
The friction theory does not support application of the DOE in this case. The
limitation of language friction does not apply because it was easy enough to
specify manganese silicate. Likewise, the unforeseeable technology friction
does not apply because the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes was
disclosed in the prior art. As Justice Black states in his dissent:
In view of the intense study and experimentation [by the patentee] with
manganese silicate, it would be frivolous to contend that failure specifically to
include that substance in a precise claim was unintentional. Nor does respondent attempt to give that or any other explanation for its omission. But the
similar use of manganese in prior expired patents, referred to in the Court’s
opinion, raises far more than a suspicion that its elimination from the valid
claims stemmed from fear that its inclusion by name might result in denial or
subsequent invalidation of respondent’s patent.128

The Graver Tank Court offered no rationale for applying the DOE other than a
fairness-based theory.129 Sensible application of the friction theory would recognize that manganese silicate technology was readily available (as were other
forms in Winans) and easily could have been inserted in the claims at issue. To
permit application of the DOE in this setting provides claim drafters with
perverse incentives to claim ambiguously without giving much thought to
extant technology.
126. Id. at 346.
127. Id. at 347.
128. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 616–17 (1950).
129. Id. at 607–08 (discussing the DOE’s role in preventing the theft of a patented invention). And
the Warner-Jenkinson and Festo Courts uncritically accepted the outcome in Graver Tank without
looking carefully at the alleged constraints on claim drafting. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 733 (2002)
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In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court signaled its concern about the
impact of the DOE on the notice function of claim language, but it offered little
guidance about how the doctrine should be applied, and paid little attention to
the claim drafting process. The Court sanctioned application of the DOE to a
case in which frictions were quite small.130 The patent claimed a dye purification process with “a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0.” The pH range of 6.0 to
9.0 formed part of an amendment made during prosecution to overcome the
prior art Booth patent, which disclosed a pH of greater than 9. While it was
readily understood why the patentee adopted an upper pH range of 9, it was less
clear why a lower limitation was added.131 Warner-Jenkinson’s accused process
used a pH of 5.
The traditional frictions do not fare well as an explanation of why the
patentee needed the DOE in Warner-Jenkinson. It is hard to fathom that inherent
limitations of language precluded Hilton Davis from claiming a pH lower than 6
or that the prosecuting attorney simply committed a mistake. Further, one would
be hard pressed to make the case that a pH of 5 was an unforeseeable
technology. Indeed, Warner-Jenkinson independently developed its accused
process only a year after Hilton Davis’ patent issued.
The narrow claim language in the patents in these three cases and in other
DOE cases is not explained by unavoidable frictions, and is likely explained by
two other factors. First, prosecutors and inventors strategically choose narrow
claims to limit disclosure to the examiner and avoid patentability problems, or
because the inventor decides to seek a mix of patent and trade secret protection.132 Second, prosecutors simply fail to exert the effort required to construct
broader claims. Often, inventors and patent attorneys fail to appreciate design
alternatives or identify substitute components or ingredients because of lack of
effort. For example, in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc.,133 the
patentee failed to refine his claims to obtain broader protection for his invention,
a disposal container for hazardous material. According to the court:
If Sage desired broad patent protection for any container that performed a
function similar to its claimed container, it could have sought claims with
fewer structural encumbrances. . . . Instead, Sage left the PTO with manifestly
limited claims that it now seeks to expand through the [DOE]. . . . This court
recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on forethought in patent
drafting. Indeed this premium may lead to higher costs of patent prosecution.134

130. The Court did require the patent owner to clear a more rigorous prosecution history estoppel
hurdle. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33–34 (1997).
131. Hilton Davis argued that the patented process would be ineffectual using a pH of 5 or lower,
but Warner-Jenkinson asserted that the process worked with a pH as low as 2.2. Id. at 22 n.2.
132. See James J. Anton & Denis A. Yao, Start-Ups, Spin-Offs, and Internal Projects, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 362, 376 (1995).
133. 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
134. Id. at 1425.
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B. OVERCOMING FRICTIONS THROUGH REFINEMENT

Patent prosecutors have access to a range of claim-drafting techniques that
mitigate problems with language and later-developed technology. Contract and
statute drafters ultimately choose particular language, but claim drafters can
hedge their bets by filing multiple independent and dependent claims.135 Although the Patent Act requires definite claim language, in practice the courts
uphold patent claims using words of degree such as “substantially”136 or
“about,”137 and will not invalidate claims unless “insolubly ambiguous.”138
Patent law accommodates inventors who have an incomplete understanding of
their invention, for example by allowing product-by-process claims.139 Such a
claim may be used by an inventor who cannot characterize a new compound,
but who can describe the process that produces the compound. Finally, a core
principle of claim construction states that an inventor can act as her own
lexicographer, thus a claim drafter can coin words that are used in the claim and
defined in the specification.140
Sophisticated claim drafting mitigates two especially difficult problems. First,
claim drafting can be burdensome because of the asymmetry between the patent
applicant and the potential competitor. Apparently, the applicant has to enumerate and claim all the possible ways of practicing the invention, but the competitor only has to find one unclaimed way to practice the invention. We call this the
enumeration problem.141 Second, prosecutors sometimes struggle to craft language that will cover equivalent technology that has not yet been developed.
Functional claim language is one technique that can avoid the enumeration
problem.142 Section 112, paragraph 6 of the Patent Act permits “means-plusfunction” claim language. For example, an applicant might claim component x,
component y, and a means for fastening x to y. The applicant is required to
disclose at least one such means in the written description, for example, a screw.
The means-plus-function claim language is read to literally cover a screw and
any equivalent fastener that serves an identical function (fastening in this
example) such as a nail or a rivet.143
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the
case admits, in dependent or multiple dependent form.”).
136. See Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119–20 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
137. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
138. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. 359 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
139. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 22, §§ 2113, 2173.05(p).
140. See Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
141. Justice Curtis in Winans presumably was influenced by the enumeration problem. See Winans
v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 336, 343 (1853); supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text; see
also W. Elec. Co. v. LaRue, 139 U.S. 601, 606 (1891) (“Since the case of Winans v. Denmead, . . . it has
been the settled doctrine of this court . . . that ‘the patentee, having described his invention, and shown
its principles, and claimed it in that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of the
law, deemed to claim every form in which his invention may be copied . . . .’”).
142. See Kieff, supra note 19, at 111–12.
143. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(concluding that literal infringement of a means-plus-function limitation requires “the accused device
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Moreover, the applicant can use the Markush claiming format,144 which “is a
sort of homemade generic expression covering a group of two or more different
materials (elements, radicals, compounds, etc.), mechanical elements, or process steps that will work in the combination claimed.”145 The group, known as a
Markush group, allows the applicant to list several alternative structures or
species that can be used for the invention, but then claim only one of the
possible structures or species as the invention.146 For instance, a Markush claim
may read: a composition of matter comprising C-H-C-R, wherein R is selected
from a group consisting of 1, 2, 3, and 4 or a compound having heat resistant
properties, wherein said compound is selected from a group consisting of A, B,
C, and D.147
Surprisingly, certain claim-drafting techniques allow inventors to claim technology that incorporates elements that have not been developed. Consider for
example a patentable tennis racket that differs from previous rackets in terms of
its shape and dimensions. The inventor must describe a suitable material for use
in the racket, but should avoid limiting herself to a particular material. In recent
years, rackets have become lighter and stronger, as manufacturers moved from
wood to aluminum to graphite. An inventor, familiar with this trend, should
describe the material used to make his racket in general terms, and then the
patent claim will literally cover a racket of the same shape and dimension even

perform the identical function as that identified in the means clause and do so with structure which is
the same as or equivalent to that disclosed in the specification”). Means-plus-function language cannot
be stretched to cover later developed technology because the structural equivalents are determined at
the time the patent issues, not the time of infringement. In other words, if the technology embodied in
the accused product was available at the time the patent issued, then infringement under a § 112, ¶ 6
claim is deemed literal infringement because the “literal meaning of a claim is fixed upon issuance.”
But if the accused technology was developed after the patent issued, infringement exists, if at all, under
the common law DOE. See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Even if such an element is found not to be a § 112, ¶ 6, equivalent because it is not equivalent to the
structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis should not foreclose it from being an equivalent under the
doctrine of equivalents.”). But see Mark D. Janis, Who’s Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the
Patent Law’s § 112, ¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 279 (1999)
(arguing Chiuminatta was a mistake); Ronald D. Hantman, Why Not the Statute? Revisited, 83 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 685, 703–04 (2001) (“[A] later invented equivalent ought to infringe a
claimed invention (literal infringement) unless the later invented equivalent is so far changed from the
claimed invention that it ceases to be an equivalent under § 112, ¶ 6.”).
144. See Ex parte Markush, 1925 C.D. 126 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1925).
145. ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON THE MECHANICS OF CLAIM DRAFTING § 50, at 149 (3d ed. 1990).
146. See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977):
It is generally understood that in thus describing a class of compounds an applicant is, in
effect, asserting that the members of the Markush group do not fall within any recognized
generic class, but are alternatively usable for the purposes of the invention, and therefore,
regardless of which of the alternatives is substituted on the basic structure, the compound as a
whole will exhibit the disclosed utility.
147. Markush claims can be particularly effective in the biotechnological and chemical arts. But it is
sometimes used in the mechanical and electrical arts, as well. See FABER, supra note 145, § 50.
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if it is made from a substance that was not known at the time of the patent
application.148 Of course, the inventor can also choose to file a continuation-inpart application149 or take advantage of the reissue mechanism.150 A computerrelated example of later-developed technology that might have been claimed
comes from Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.151 Hughes involved synchronous communications satellite technology that addressed attitude control or the
need to orient the satellite in space. Williams, the inventor of the 3,758,051
patent (the “’051 patent”), developed a ground-controlled satellite whereby sun
pulses were provided to an external location (i.e., a ground crew on earth)
sufficient to determine spin angle or ISA position. (The ISA position is the
“measure of where the satellite is in its spin cycle at any instant of time.”)152
The ground crew would then use this information to simulate the rotation of the
satellite and to calculate the satellite’s spin rate, sun angle, and ISA position.
The sun pulses were known in real time, allowing the ground crew to transmit
control signals for immediate execution. In the accused products, the sun pulses
were transmitted to an on-board computer, not a ground crew. The computer
calculated the spin rate and transmitted it to earth (as well as other information)
from which the ground crew calculated the sun angle. Moreover, real-time
execution based on receipt of control signals was absent from the accused
products; instead, the on-board computer stored the control signals for later
execution.
The Hughes court fully endorsed the fairness theory and applied the DOE,
even though it recognized the inventor could have claimed the later-developed
technology. The court opined that later-developed technology, in this case
computers, should not permit the “accused spacecraft to escape the ‘web of
148. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharms., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592 (E.D. Va.
2002):
[W]hen redrafting claims 14–15 and 18–19, the patentee could have attempted to claim all
hydrogel-forming polymers as the mechanism to control the release rate of bupropion
hydrochloride, rather than claim only HPMC. This more broadly drafted limitation would also
have encompassed yet-to-be discovered hydrogel-forming polymers. Because PVA, like HPMC,
is a hydrogel-forming polymer, the redrafted claims would have literally encompassed PVA.
For this reason, the court concludes that at the time of the claim amendments, one skilled in
the art could have reasonably drafted the claims to encompass PVA . . . .
149. A continuation-in-part repeats much of the content of an earlier application but also bolsters the
disclosure with new matter. New claims are entitled to the priority date of the earlier application unless
they depend on the new matter. While continuation practice provides socially valuable opportunities to
refine claims, it can be strategically abused. Ideally, continuation practice should be reformed so the
problems created by an overly generous DOE do not resurface in that setting. See Mark A. Lemley &
Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 63 (2004).
150. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
151. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the application of the DOE to industryspecific settings, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1575 (2003).
152. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1360.
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infringement.’”153 Williams, who was working closely with NASA and other
government entities (soon to become defendants), filed his initial patent application in 1960 and filed a CIP in 1964. The patent issued in September of 1973,
and Hughes, Williams’ assignee, filed an infringement against the United States
one month later. Assuming the use of an on-board computer was not feasible at
the time Williams filed his applications, he nonetheless could have drafted claim
language to capture the accused devices without resort to the DOE. Both the
’051 claimed invention and the accused devices were ground controlled, even
though the accused devices employed an on-board computer, a post-Williams
development. Thus, Williams could have drafted claim language that rendered
on-board later-developed technology irrelevant for purposes of infringement. In
fact, the court stated that “Williams did not submit claims broadly covering all
ground controllable spacecraft, as he might have,” but “[h]ad he done so . . .
literal infringement would have been present here.”154
C. THE NOTICE THEORY AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

One of most common objections to the DOE is the doctrine’s negative effect
on the notice function of patent claims. Good patent policy should balance the
benefits created by expanded patent scope against the costs of expanded scope
and fuzzy property rights. To be sure, both the fairness and friction theories
preclude application of the DOE to extend patent protection over technology in
the public domain.155 But the theories fail to address the uncertainty created by
the doctrine.156 DOE case law tries to strike an ad hoc balance between patent
owners’ interests and costs to the public, including the cost of uncertain
property rights. Recently, the balance has shifted increasingly in favor of public

153. Id. at 1365. According to the court, “[o]nce an on-board computer became available, . . . any
intelligent engineer designing [the accused device] would say “Look, I don’t need to send the value of
that ISA position to the ground, it’s right there in the spacecraft. I’ll just key my firing signal to that on
board the spacecraft.’” Id. at 1364–65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 1363 (emphasis added). Moreover, arguably Williams, as a person skilled in the art of
satellite control, should have understood the equivalence of on-board microprocessors and predicted
their success as a substitute for ground-based computers. Id. at 1365; see also Laura A. Handley,
Refining the Graver Tank Analysis with Hypothetical Claims: A Biotechnology Exemplar, 5 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 31, 38 (1991).
155. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (stating that “a patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage
which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims”); Burk & Lemley, supra
note 151, at 1594 (stating that “a patentee is not permitted to capture claim scope under the doctrine of
equivalents that she would not have been permitted to capture at the time of prosecution”).
156. It is important to realize that patent litigation would still be quite uncertain even if the DOE
were abolished. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 n.10 (2001):
In 1999, I conducted a survey at the annual conference of the Association of Corporate Patent
Counsels. On a scale of 1–10 (with 10 being very confident), respondents’ confidence in the
jury’s ability to understand the technology in patent cases was only 3.7. One Chief Patent
Counsel with more than thirty years experience wrote ‘JURIES JUST PLAIN CAN’T
DECIDE PATENT CASES PERIOD. . . . THIS IS HOPELESS.’ Interestingly, the respondents
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costs as the Federal Circuit has bolstered various notice-based rules to brake the
expansion of the DOE and reduce the uncertainty it creates. Three particularly
important rules are: (1) the all-elements rule; (2) the public dedication rule; and
(3) the prosecution history estoppel rule. We believe the Federal Circuit is
strengthening constraints on the DOE because it is starting to appreciate the
endogenous nature of claim-drafting frictions, and the negative effects of the
doctrine on the incentive to draft high quality applications.
1. The All-Elements Rule
Historically, infringement was determined by looking at the claimed invention as a whole.157 But beginning in the late 1980s, the Federal Circuit grew
wary of this approach because of its failure to give adequate weight to each
claim limitation and its inability to cabin jury discretion. This evolution culminated in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.158 An en banc Federal Circuit
emphasized the importance of each claim limitation when determining infringement under the DOE, noting that “each limitation must be viewed in the context
of the entire claim.”159 To this end, the court, over a vigorous dissent, adopted
what has been called the “all-elements rule” or “all-limitations rule,”160 whereby
a DOE inquiry compares the accused product to each claim limitation instead of
the invention as a whole.161 As Judge Nies added in a concurring opinion, “If an
accused device does not contain at least an equivalent for each limitation of the
claim, there is no infringement because a required part of the claimed invention
is missing.”162 In support, the court cited the following language from a prior
opinion:

did not have much more confidence in the ability of district court judges to understand the
technology in patent cases. On a scale of 1–10, their confidence in judges was only 5.6.
157. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1364; Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
822 F.2d 1528, 1532–33 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
158. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
159. Id. at 935.
160. The Federal Circuit has expressed a preference for the word “limitation” (instead of “element”)
when referring to claim language, and “element” when referring to the accused device. See Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“In our
prior cases, we have used both the term ‘element’ and the term ‘limitation’ to refer to words in a claim.
It is preferable to use the term ‘limitation’ when referring to claim language and the term ‘element’
when referring to the accused device.”). To this end, the court has also noted that the “All Elements rule
might better be called the All Limitations rule.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149
F.3d 1309, 1317 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
161. The operation of the all-elements rule is illustrated in the following example. Suppose a patent
claims a process comprising step 1, followed by step 2, followed by step 3. Suppose an alleged
infringer gets the process to work using step 1 followed by step 3 with step 2 omitted. Then there is no
literal infringement because step 2 is omitted. Similarly, the all-elements rule of Pennwalt precludes
application of the DOE because step 2 is omitted. Under the old rule, a finding of infringement under
the DOE was possible when courts looked at the invention as a whole.
162. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949 (Nies, J., concurring).
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One must start with the claim, and though a “non-pioneer” invention may be
entitled to some range of equivalents, a court may not, under the guise of
applying the doctrine of equivalents, erase a plethora of meaningful structural
and functional limitations of the claim on which the public is entitled to rely
in avoiding infringement. . . . Though the doctrine of equivalents is designed
to do equity, and to relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket when
equity requires, it is not designed to permit wholesale redrafting of a claim to
cover non-equivalent devices, i.e., to permit a claim expansion that would
encompass more than an insubstantial change.163

The rationale behind the all-elements rule is that a particularized DOE analysis
will better serve the notice function. The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., recognizing that “[t]here can be no denying
that the doctrine of equivalents . . . conflicts with the definitional and publicnotice functions of the statutory claiming requirement,”164 adopted the elementby-element test for the DOE.165
2. The Public Dedication Rule
Recent Federal Circuit panels have jostled over the question of whether the
DOE is barred when the alleged equivalent is expressly disclosed in the patent,
but not literally claimed.166 In Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,167 the patent concerned
a system for attaching mated pairs of shoes. The patent’s claims required an
“extended separate tab” arrangement. An accused product used an “under the
sock lining” arrangement. The patent disclosed an “under the sock lining”
arrangement as an alternative embodiment. The Federal Circuit reversed a
judgment of infringement based on a jury verdict.168 The court reasoned that to
allow an equivalency finding in such a case would permit patentees to file broad
disclosures and then escape PTO examination by presenting only narrow

163. Id. at 935 (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532–33
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
164. 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
165. According to the Court:
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the
patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements
of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of
the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety. So long as the doctrine of equivalents does not encroach
beyond the limits just described, or beyond related limits . . . we are confident that the doctrine
will not vitiate the central functions of the patent claims themselves.
Id. at 29–30.
166. The dedication rule dates back to the late nineteenth century. See Miller v. Bridgeport Brass
Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) (“[T]he claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission to
claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the
public of that which is not claimed.”).
167. 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
168. Id. at 1112.
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claims.169 It noted that a patentee who claims too narrowly can seek reissue
within two years of the patent’s issuance.
Maxwell carefully distinguished the Supreme Court’s Graver Tank decision,
in which the alleged equivalent element (manganese silicate) was disclosed in
the specification. In Graver Tank, the patent contained both a broad claim that
included manganese silicates generically and a narrower claim that was limited
to alkaline earth silicates, which excluded manganese silicates. The Supreme
Court held that the broader claim was invalid but that the narrower claim was
valid and was infringed under the DOE.170 Thus, the disclosed equivalent was
not in fact “unclaimed” and could not be said to have been dedicated to the
public.171
Two years later, in YBM Magnex, Inc. v. ITC,172 the court rebuffed Maxwell.
But the Federal Circuit eventually granted en banc review to resolve the
Maxwell/YBM conflict. In Johnson & Johnston Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service
Co.,173 the court sided with Maxwell:
As stated in Maxwell, when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim
subject matter, as in this case, this action dedicates that unclaimed subject
matter to the public. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture
subject matter deliberately left unclaimed would “conflict with the primacy of
the claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.”174

3. Prosecution History Estoppel: An Absolute Bar Approach . . . Almost
In May of 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,175 one of the most significant patent
law cases in recent history. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the need to maintain, on the one hand, the integrity of one’s
proprietary interest, and, on the other hand, the need for competitors (and the
public to a lesser extent) to enjoy a degree of certainty so that they may engage
169. Id. at 1117.
170. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
171. See also Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“In Maxwell . . . we explained the contrary principle that ‘subject matter disclosed in the specification,
but not claimed, is dedicated to the public in determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.’ . . . Having fully disclosed two distinct embodiments, one in which the first and second
longitudinal strips extend a majority of the length of the longitudinal marginal portions, and one in
which they do not, Moore is not entitled to ‘enforce the unclaimed embodiment as an equivalent of the
one that was claimed.’”).
172. 145 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The Supreme Court’s guidance in Warner-Jenkinson
and Graver Tank does not permit the blanket rule that everything disclosed but not claimed is barred
from access to the doctrine of equivalents, whatever the facts, circumstances, and evidence.” (citations
omitted)). In Warner-Jenkinson the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of dedication by
unclaimed disclosure. It did reject the opposite argument: that equivalents should be limited to
equivalents disclosed in the patent.
173. 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
174. Id. at 1054.
175. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).

1982

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 93:1947

in improvement or design-around activity. In short, a “patent holder should
know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not.”176
The Court explored this “delicate balance” in the context of the DOE and
Prosecution History Estoppel (PHE).177 The former was reaffirmed, despite the
uncertainty it engenders, “as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for
innovation.”178 But to ameliorate the problems associated with inevitable uncertainty, the Court also reaffirmed the role of PHE as an important interpretive,
uncertainty-limiting tool. Along the way, the Court, while sympathetic to the
Federal Circuit’s concern about the DOE’s destabilizing impact on the notice
function, reversed the Federal Circuit’s absolute bar approach.179 The “absolute
bar” precluded application of the DOE with respect to a narrowed claim
limitation regardless of the reason. The Supreme Court admonished the Federal
Circuit “that courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the
settled expectations of the inventing community.”180 The Court settled on a
compromise between the absolute bar and the earlier flexible bar approach.181
But the Court, clearly concerned about uncertainty in a property-rights
system, established a rebuttable presumption, which begins with an understanding that a narrowing amendment is a “general disclaimer of the territory
between the original claim and the amended claim.”182 Unless rebutted, PHE
“bars a finding of equivalence.”183 How can the patentee rebut the presumption?
The patentee must show that at the time the application was filed, a person
having ordinary skill in the art would have literally claimed the equivalent but
did not because “[1] [t]he equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time
of the application; [2] the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no

176. Id. at 731.
177. Prosecution history estoppel precludes application of the DOE to recover subject matter that
was surrendered during patent prosecution. See id. at 734.
178. Id. at 732.
179. Id. at 740–41.
180. Id. at 739 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)).
181. Accordingly:
The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still fail to
capture precisely what the claim is. There is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be
deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a
fair interpretation of what was surrendered. Nor is there any call to foreclose claims of
equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral relation to the reason the
amendment was submitted. The amendment does not show that the inventor suddenly had
more foresight in the drafting of claims than an inventor whose application was granted
without amendments having been submitted. It shows only that he was familiar with the
broader text and with the difference between the two. As a result, there is no more reason for
holding the patentee to the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for abolishing the
doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee to the literal terms of the patent.
This view of prosecution history estoppel is consistent with our precedents and respectful of
the real practice before the PTO.
Id. at 738.
182. Id. at 740.
183. Id. at 741.
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more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or [3] . . . some
other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to
have described the insubstantial substitute in question.”184
The all-elements rule, public dedication rule, and the rebuttable absolute bar
presumption185 are all attempts by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court to
elevate the importance of the patent law’s notice function. A laudable goal, but
to what end? Of course, clarity is valuable, but these rules tell us nothing about
how and when the DOE should apply. A critical theory, like the notice theory,
must be complemented by a constructive theory justifying the DOE. We believe
the refinement theory does just that.
III. A MODEL OF INVENTION, REFINEMENT, AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. BASIC MODEL

A simple game-theoretic model yields a rich, intuitive understanding of the
role of the DOE in patent law. Our basic model features two players: an
inventor and a competitor. The inventor decides whether to undertake invention,
and whether to refine the invention. Following the inventor’s actions, the
competitor may have an opportunity to imitate the invention, depending on the
inventor’s actions and whether the DOE applies. Specifically, the inventor
decides whether to invest w to invent the embodiments in set E.186 Next, the
inventor decides whether to invest x to refine the invention and obtain the
embodiments in set F.187 Finally, the competitor decides whether to invest y to

184. Id. at 740–41. The Court was careful not to call this presumption a “complete bar by another
name,” but it will be interesting to see just how often patentees are able to successfully rebut the
presumption.
185. In addition to these three rules, in the mid-1990s there was a strong push, ultimately unsuccessful, to take the equivalents inquiry away from the jury, which was thought to be too capricious for a
well-functioning property-rights system. For example, in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), the majority treated the DOE as a factual
question for the jury, but the dissent argued that the DOE should be invoked at the court’s discretion as
an equitable tool. Id. at 1549 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (noting that the DOE should only be applied in
“unusual cases” and that the “fact-finder should principally be focused on claims . . . . Otherwise, the
meaning of the claims is diminished, contrary to the statutory scheme that a patent specification shall
conclude with claims that particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention”). Although the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, it declined to address the jury issue. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38–39 (1997) (“Because resolution of whether, or how much of,
the application of the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved by the court is not necessary for us to
answer the question presented, we decline to take it up . . . . Whether, if the issue were squarely
presented to us, we would reach a different conclusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we
need decide today.”).
186. We assume the inventor knows exactly how much to spend, and exactly what result she will
obtain at both the invention and refinement stage. One can obtain results similar to those described
above with a more general research technology, for example, a technology in which the probability of
obtaining E is an increasing function of w (likewise for F and x).
187. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 236–37 (describing extra costs that would be imposed on patent
applicants by restricting the DOE).
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imitate the invention and develop an embodiment in F.188 This section contains
an intuitive discussion and the appendix contains the formal analysis of the
model.
First, we analyze the model under a regime with the DOE. We suppose that
the inventor cannot claim any invention unless she invests w. If she invests w,
then she achieves an invention and enables two distinct sets of embodiments E
and F. Notice that our assumption that set F is enabled does not imply the
inventor “possesses” the embodiments in F or can claim F. (We assume that a
claim to E and F satisfies novelty, non-obviousness and other patent requirements.) We implement the DOE by assuming the inventor only needs to claim
the embodiments in E to get the rights to both sets of embodiments.189 The
competitor is deterred from using an embodiment in E or F because of the threat
of a patent suit.
In the regime without the DOE the inventor’s rights are limited to the literal
scope of her claim. She claims only the embodiments she obtains through
invention and refinement. If she invents E but does not refine her invention, then
her patent claim is limited to E. If she invents and refines, then she claims E and
F. In a regime without the DOE the competitor never uses an embodiment in E
because of the threat of suit, but may invest y to obtain an embodiment in F if
the inventor chooses not to refine.
To properly interpret the model, the reader must understand exactly what we
mean by refinement, and how we model patent claims, the enablement doctrine,
and literal infringement. We define refinement as the process of identifying and
claiming the broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled by the disclosure
in the patent specification. We distinguish refinement from enablement and
reduction to practice. The technical disclosure made in the patent application
enables a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice a range of embodiments of the technology. In our model we always assume that the inventor has
enabled sets E and F. In other words, the hypothetical person of ordinary skill
can make and use the embodiments in E and F without undue experimentation.190 Actual reduction to practice occurs when an inventor makes a physical
embodiment of an invention and the invention works for its intended purpose.191 In general, patent rights are obtainable without actual reduction of an
invention to practice as long as the written description and claims satisfy the

188. See supra note 23 for a discussion of how we define “imitation.”
189. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 845–60 (explaining how claim breadth and the doctrine
of equivalents determine the scope of a claim).
190. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The enablement
requirement is satisfied when one skilled in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the
claimed invention without undue experimentation.”).
191. Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To establish an actual reduction to
practice, an inventor must prove that he constructed his claimed invention and that it would work for its
intended purpose.”).
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enablement and other disclosure requirements.192 Similarly, we allow the inventor in our model to literally claim set F, regardless of whether she actually
reduced to practice the embodiments in F. Instead, the model allows the
inventor to literally claim F after mentally identifying the embodiments in F as
following from the same inventive principle that led to E.
The payoffs to the inventor and the competitor depend on the actions they
choose and whether the DOE is available. Given invention and refinement, the
inventor gets patent rights covering E and F, and earns the monopoly profit of
M2. Given invention without refinement, the inventor gets patent rights covering
E and F under the DOE regime, and earns a smaller monopoly profit of M1. The
monopoly profit depends in part on whether the inventor has invested in
refinement. Refinement gives the inventor a better understanding of the invention, a different source of value than patent scope, thus, M2 is greater than M1.
Given invention without refinement, the inventor gets patent rights covering E
under the regime without the DOE. If the competitor develops an embodiment
in F, then both parties earn a duopoly profit of D, and if the competitor does not
develop an embodiment in F, then the inventor earns a profit of M1, and the
competitor gets nothing.193 We use the term monopoly for convenience and do
not mean to imply that the inventor becomes a true monopolist for some new
product. We simply intend that M1 represents the profit attributable to the patent
when the inventor does not refine and no other firm uses the invention.
Similarly, D is the profit available to the inventor and the competitor when they
both practice the technology.

192. This is known as “constructive reduction to practice,” which is usually accomplished by filing
an enabling patent application with so-called “paper examples.” The Federal Circuit has described
constructive reduction to practice as follows:
Paper examples meet the practical need of compliance with the requirement for specific
embodiments of every invention, as well as with aspects of patent law such as the need to
provide a full range of variables or to describe and enable alternatives or equivalents. To fulfill
their legal purpose, such examples must be enabling of specific embodiments. For some
inventions the detailed embodiments can be described and enabled by the inventor without
conducting full laboratory experiments or building entire machines. The patent law authorizes
that an invention may be constructively reduced to practice by filing a patent application,
whether the embodiments were actually made or are constructed in the patent application.
“Constructive reduction to practice” is a legal status unique to the patent art. Unlike the rules
for scientific publications, which require actual performance of every experimental detail,
patent law and practice are directed to teaching the invention so that it can be practiced. The
inclusion of constructed examples in a patent application is an established method of providing the technical content needed to support the conceived scope of the invention.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
193. The inventor receives M1 under a DOE regime when he does not expend x and refine; or, under
a no DOE regime when neither he refines nor the competitor imitates. Because the competitor does not
imitate, the inventor in a no DOE world still earns M1 (instead of D) even though his patent scope is
limited to E. Therefore, the inventor’s profit in a no DOE regime is dependent upon whether the
competitor expends y and imitates. If the competitor imitates, both parties earn monopoly profit D
whereby M1 ⬍ D.
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Figure 1
We designed the model so that the behavior under the DOE regime is very
easy to understand. The competitor never uses the technology because of the
threat of a patent suit. The inventor invents if the cost of invention w is not too
high, and conditional on invention, refines if the cost of refinement x is not too
high. Figure 1 displays the equilibrium outcomes under both regimes; outcomes
under the DOE regime are listed in italics, and outcomes under the no DOE
regime are listed in bold. The cost of invention is measured along the horizontal
axis and the cost of refinement is measured along the vertical axis. The region
labeled NO INVENTION indicates the inventor does not invent if the costs of
invention plus refinement are high. The region labeled EFFICIENT REFINEMENT indicates the inventor efficiently invents and refines when invention and
refinement costs are sufficiently low. We describe refinement as efficient because it is socially valuable and profitable regardless of strategic considerations.
In the remaining three regions, IMITATION,194 PIONEER INVENTION, and
PREEMPTIVE REFINEMENT, the DOE regime leads to invention but no
refinement because in these three regions the cost of refinement x is greater than
the benefit from refinement M2 – M1. Equilibrium behavior is more complicated
under the regime without the DOE, because the possibility of entry by the
competitor influences the inventor’s behavior. That possibility is missing from

194. See supra note 23 for a discussion of how we define “imitation.”
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the regime with the DOE because the inventor automatically gains rights over F
when she obtains set E. Under the regime without the DOE, the inventor may
refine the technology for strategic reasons rather than efficiency. In other words,
the inventor may obtain F simply to block the competitor from developing an
embodiment in F or to enhance his bargaining position in a cross-licensing
negotiation.195 We call this preemptive refinement.
Preemption is not an issue when the competitor does not pose a credible
threat of entry. Even without the DOE, the competitor will not develop an
embodiment in F if the cost of refinement is too high or the duopoly profit is too
low. Precisely, if D ⬍ y then competition is not credible and equilibrium
behavior is the same under either regime. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium
outcomes without DOE in the interesting case when D ⱖ y; thus, the competitor
will find imitation profitable if he has the opportunity.
Figure 1 facilitates a policy comparison of the DOE and no DOE regimes. It
shows that equilibrium outcomes are the same in the NO INVENTION and
EFFICIENT REFINEMENT regions. The presence of a potential competitor is
irrelevant for parameter values falling in these regions. In the NO INVENTION
region invention is too costly regardless of whether the DOE is available. In the
EFFICIENT REFINEMENT region refinement is profitable regardless of whether
a competitor exists.
In the other three regions the DOE yields different outcomes from the regime
without the DOE. The DOE induces invention in the region labeled PIONEER
INVENTION, but there is no invention without it. The absence of the DOE
induces refinement in the region labeled PREEMPTIVE REFINEMENT, but
there is no refinement given the DOE. Finally, the absence of DOE allows entry
in the region labeled IMITATION, while there is neither refinement nor imitation under the DOE.
The model yields four main results that have policy significance. We present
these results in the following four propositions.
Proposition 1. The DOE does not strengthen patent rights when the
inventor’s cost of refinement is relatively small, or when a potential competitor does not pose a credible threat of entry. The two regimes give the same
results when the inventor’s refinement cost is less than or equal to the benefit
from obtaining both sets of embodiments E and F, i.e., x ⱕ M2 – M1. This
equivalence arises because the greater scope offered by the DOE is immaterial
when the inventor gains a direct benefit from refinement. Likewise, the two
regimes are equivalent when the potential competitor does not pose a credible
threat of entry because the duopoly profit is small relative to the competitor’s
refinement cost, i.e., D ⬍ y. In these cases policy should be chosen on the basis
195. This type of behavior is quite common among certain industries. See generally Wesley M.
Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (empirical study demonstrating that certain industries seek patent
protection to block rivals from developing technology or to enhance licensing bargaining position).
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of considerations outside the scope of our model. For example, one might
choose no DOE because the DOE creates fuzzier property rights and imposes
greater litigation costs.196
Proposition 1 helps identify conditions such that the notice concern about
patent claims should weigh heavily in formulating patent policy.197 Patent law
appears to be roughly consistent with this goal; it constrains the use of the DOE
when it is likely to create uncertainty costs with little offsetting benefits. For
example, two doctrines properly limit the DOE based on prosecution activities.
First, prosecution history estoppel creates a presumption against the DOE for
embodiments ceded by amendment or argument.198 Second, the public dedication doctrine precludes the use of the DOE to protect embodiments that inventors have described in their applications without claiming.199 In both situations,

196. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., concurring) (“Persons who appropriate the patentee’s concept may add technologic value
in a variety of ways: perhaps by developing a different path to the new markets opened by the patentee,
perhaps by adapting later-developed technology to enhance that of the patentee, perhaps by perceiving
alternatives and opportunities from a different perspective than that of the patentee. All of these
activities would bear lower risk to the appropriator if the patentee’s claims were strictly limited to their
literal scope, for the patentee’s access to the remedy of equivalency imposes upon the appropriator the
risk of litigation, damages, and injunction.”). On the other hand, we note in footnote 156, supra, that
litigation would be quite uncertain even if the DOE were abolished.
197. Thomas argues that the notice theory is flawed and that it should not play an important role in
DOE policy. See Thomas, supra note 119, at 160–69. We find aspects of his argument persuasive, but
reject his conclusion. Our disagreement arises in part because courts and commentators have not fully
developed the notice theory, and the label is used in different ways by different authors. We perceive
three social costs aggravated by uncertain patent scope: opportunistic and anticompetitive patent suits;
licensing problems; and inadvertent infringement. Thomas focuses on the third problem, and argues that
restricting the DOE has done little to reduce the problem of inadvertent infringement. In contrast, we
emphasize that restrictions on the DOE likely reduce the first two costs significantly. We think the effect
of the DOE on inadvertent infringement is an open question.
Thomas argues competitors find it difficult to avoid patent infringement when they introduce new
technology because of the high number of enforceable patents, the secrecy of many pending applications, factors discouraging prior art search, and the obscurity of claim language. Id. at 161–63. He
doubts that constraints on the DOE will make much difference in light of these other problems. It is
possible, however, that restrictions on the DOE created, for example, by the public dedication rule
might create safe harbors that will reduce the risk of inadvertent infringement. Ultimately, the effect of
the DOE on inadvertent infringement presents an empirical question that will be difficult to answer. We
are more confident that the clarity created by restricting the DOE significantly facilitates licensing.
Obviously, the problems of secrecy and patent volume are not relevant when two parties negotiate a
license. In addition, for patents in which the parties agree on the meaning of the claims, the DOE is the
chief source of uncertainty and the main impediment to a licensing agreement.
Finally, our broader understanding of the notice theory suggests a different sort of benefit arises from
restrictions on the DOE. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is very difficult to achieve in
patent lawsuits if the factual questions presented by the DOE are always in play. Legal questions that
bar application of the DOE make it more likely that a defendant can prevail on summary judgment.
Possibly, this promotes settlement in patent cases, and surely helps discourage opportunistic and
anticompetitive patent litigation. See Meurer, supra note 30, at 530–35.
198. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741–42 (2002).
199. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
banc); Matthew C. Phillips, Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell To Tame the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 155, 180–81 (2000) (“The needed additional step is to
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the cost of refining a claim to include such embodiments must be low.200
The DOE should also be limited or proscribed for minor inventions in
crowded fields of technology. Competitors have little motivation to invent
around a patent claim (i.e., develop an embodiment in F) when the prior art
offers adequate substitutes. Patent law has taken steps to restrict the DOE in
crowded fields of technology by precluding its application to accused devices in
the prior art and those obvious in light of the prior art.201
Proposition 2. Pioneer inventions should enjoy a presumption in favor of
applying the DOE. The DOE induces inventions that would not occur in its
absence. Prospective inventors may be discouraged from inventing when they
face high invention and high refinement costs. The inventor can avoid refinement costs under the DOE, and this cost saving might be crucial to encouraging
invention. Without the DOE, inventive incentives are dampened by the prospect
of paying high refinement costs or alternatively the prospect of entry by a
competitor. This insight helps justify the practice of rewarding pioneer inventors
with broader application of the DOE.
Previous discussion of pioneer inventions conflates analysis of the DOE with
the enablement doctrine. Courts and commentators have expressed a desire to
give pioneers a bigger patent-based reward. The impulse to reward pioneers
with broader patent scope seems natural. The enablement doctrine allows broad
claim scope when a pioneer enriches society with a significant technological
disclosure. Thus, generous treatment of pioneer inventions guides potential
inventors to invest in socially important research.202 This theory does not
explain, however, generous treatment of pioneer inventions under the DOE.
Patent law should be careful to avoid a double reward to pioneer inventions.
Applying the DOE to pioneer inventions with low refinement costs would be
redundant. The policy of granting more generous DOE protection only makes
sense if pioneer inventions tend to have high refinement costs. The policy
should be interpreted as using the pioneer status of an invention to create a
presumption of high refinement costs, and that presumption should be rejected
in the face of more direct evidence of low refinement costs.
Proposition 3. The DOE discourages preemptive refinement. Inventors
impute to a patent applicant knowledge of the prior art for the purpose of determining what she regards
as her invention. That is, the dedication rule applied in Maxwell should be broadened to bar from
equivalents unclaimed features that were disclosed or could have been disclosed by virtue of being
known in the art at the time of filing.”).
200. See infra Part IV.E; see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 188 (“[P]atentees could take a number of
steps to avoid any potentially deleterious consequences of a finding of prosecution history estoppel
during litigation, such as conducting prior art research to determine the appropriate scope of the claims,
drafting claims more carefully, either claiming more narrowly to avoid the prior art, or crafting claims
that, when amended, maintain a broad scope of literal coverage.”).
201. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
202. Jay Thomas observes that pioneer status as defined by patent law does not correlate very well
with the social value of an invention. See John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and
Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 52–58 (1995).
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operating in a regime without the DOE have rights only over the embodiments
they literally claim. They can only gain rights over the embodiments in F if they
invest in refinement. We apply the label preemptive refinement when the
inventor does not profit directly from claiming F, but indirectly profits by
excluding a potential competitor.203 Preemptive refinement has no direct value
to the inventor and thus will not occur under the DOE.
The social welfare effects of preemptive refinement are mixed, thus it is difficult to
draw clear policy prescriptions. Social welfare is harmed because preemptive refinement causes profit to fall as refinement costs are expended.204 But the refinement
discouraged by the DOE can be socially desirable even though it is unprofitable. It
may be socially desirable if the increase in consumer surplus more than offsets the
decline in profit. Refinement is most likely to be socially desirable when E and F are
relatively differentiated, and refinement costs are low. When E and F are relatively
differentiated, consumers who have a strong preference for F enjoy the benefit of
refinement. If the two embodiments are close substitutes, then refinement is a social as
well as a private loss. There is no social benefit from forcing an inventor to refine
essentially redundant technology.205
Proposition 4. No DOE encourages imitation. Imitation never occurs under
the DOE in our model. The no DOE regime offers potential social gains because
it encourages imitation. High refinement costs make preemptive refinement
unprofitable. Without the DOE competitors can imitate the patent if the inventor’s refinement cost stops her from refining preemptively. The social gains flow
from access to both embodiments, and also from competition between the
inventor and competitor which drives down the price and increases the diffusion
of the invention.206

203. We choose the term preemptive refinement to stress the similarity to the economic literature on
preemptive invention. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 350–52, 393 (1988).
Preemption is possible in our model because the potential competitor chooses to avoid a narrow literal
claim of E by choosing an embodiment in a clearly specified set F. The patentee can refine and claim all
the embodiments in F, and preempt the potential competitor who has no other avoidance strategy
available. In a more general model, there could be variegated avoidance strategies, some that are cheap
and others that are costly. In such a world, an attempt to preempt the cheap avoidance strategies by
claiming the relevant embodiments (presumably at a low refinement cost), would be met with a shift by
the competitor to a more costly avoidance strategy (assuming the patentee finds further refinement
unprofitable). Doug Lichtman makes a similar argument. See Lichtman, supra note 27, at 177. He uses
the label “arms race” for his argument. We prefer “preemption” because “arms race” suggests a
dynamic process that many commentators have observed in trade secret and software copyright
protection settings but does not apply in the patent settings we have in mind.
204. In this model the incentive to invent is always adequate in the PREEMPTIVE REFINEMENT
region, but in a more general model the incentive would suffer.
205. Inventors are likely to spend more refining claims to inventions they believe are more valuable.
Hence the social cost of preemptive refinement may be greater for more valuable inventions. On the
other hand, if inventors are poorly informed about the value of an invention at the time of patent
application, they might spend relatively little on preemptive refinement. Thus, evidence that inventors
have a good idea about which patents are most valuable, works in favor of a stronger DOE.
206. Those benefits are offset by the cost of refinement and the loss of innovative incentive
attributable to the decline in the inventor’s profit.
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Critics of the DOE emphasize the competitive and innovative benefits associated with inventing around patents. Those benefits are real, but they can be
exaggerated. Notice that curtailing the DOE may result in preemptive refinement by the inventor rather than competitive imitation. Gains from competition
are lost if preemptive refinement occurs rather than imitation. Also notice that
imitation by the competitor is limited in our model to cases in which the cost of
invention is relatively low and the inventor’s cost of refinement is relatively
high. Now if the competitor’s cost of development is also high, then the
competitor will not pose a credible threat of entry. Thus, inventing around a
patent depends on the competitor having a low development cost while the
inventor has a high cost of refinement.207 Certain factors make such asymmetry
plausible. The inventor might lack some expertise or asset held by the competitor that helps with development and refinement. No DOE is probably better in
this case, but maybe not if the technologies are close substitutes or if the
inventor could contract with the competitor for development services.
The social welfare case for imitation is strongest when the defendant develops an embodiment in F that improves on the technology in E.208 Merges and
Nelson write approvingly about courts who highlight technical advances in the
accused device as a way of limiting the scope of the DOE.209 This policy
preference can be implemented when judges rule as a matter of law that an
improved device does not satisfy the test of equivalency.210 Regardless of
whether the defendant is found to infringe, the possibility of patenting the
improvement remains as a source of incentive for improvers.211
B. TWO PERIOD EXTENSION

We extend the basic model by adding a second period to the development and
refinement process. As before, in the first period, the inventor enjoys an
opportunity to refine the technology before the potential entrant has a chance to

207. Imitation is unlikely in a scenario with x ⫽ y. Preemption is the norm in this case because the
inventor protects M1 – D by investing x, while the entrant is trying to capture D with an investment of y.
Normally, M1 – D is bigger than D, if x ⫽ y we should expect preemption.
208. Imitators often choose an inferior version of an invention to escape literal infringement.
Possibly, the accused process in Warner-Jenkinson illustrates this tendency. The defendant’s process
operated at a lower pH, which might have been inferior because of problems with foaming. See
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 22 n.2 (1997). The DOE has a positive
effect when it blocks deployment of an inferior technology, but the doctrine should not displace low
cost refinement efforts by inventors who can easily claim inferior versions of their technology.
Furthermore, an ideal policy also considers the benefits from ex post competition.
209. Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 854–60.
210. Id. at 857 (suggesting Texas Instruments as an example).
211. An improvement patent is valuable even if the imitator is infringing, because the owner of the
earlier patent cannot practice the improvement without permission from the improver. The improver
can profit by licensing or cross-licensing the first patent owner. The difficult policy question is whether
the incentive provided by an improvement patent is adequate. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 73;
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5
J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
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imitate. In the second period, the two firms have a simultaneous chance to
develop the technology with the possibility of lower development costs in the
second period. What does the greater complication buy us? Originally we
discussed the question of whether refinement was socially desirable—now we
can ask the additional questions: who should refine and when? The extended
model allows us to contribute to the debate about whether patent law should
encourage centralized or decentralized development of technology. And it allows us to discuss the important policy question of whether the DOE should
apply to later-developed technology.
Two related insights emerge from the two period model. First, the DOE
encourages orderly development of an invention, which brings social benefits
first recognized by Kitch.212 Kitch’s prospect theory of patents favors broad
patent scope because it discourages premature and redundant development of an
invention by competitors.213 Second, the benefits of centralized control are
smallest when the nature of development and the identity of the most efficient
developer is uncertain.214 In such cases the central control facilitated by the
DOE causes social harm, which leads us to oppose application of the DOE to
unforeseeable later-developed technology.
Proposition 5. The DOE encourages orderly development. The DOE protects the inventor from entry and allows the inventor to defer refinement to a
later date when the costs of refinement are lower. Furthermore, the entry barrier
created by the DOE promotes licensing designed to assist the inventor develop
an invention. The inventor may wish to contract for development of the
invention by a competitor with lower costs. Absent the DOE the inventor loses
the option of deferred refinement. The inventor has a natural lead-time advantage applicable to first period refinement. That advantage disappears in later
periods. If there is no DOE, then the inventor must preempt in the first period, if
at all. The DOE is socially desirable if it mitigates the harm arising because the
inventor spends a lot of money refining inferior technologies. Notice the
asymmetry here—when there is no DOE an imitator has to find only one
desirable, unclaimed embodiment, but the inventor must claim them all.
Proposition 6. The DOE should not apply to unforeseeable laterdeveloped technology. The appeal of fairness-based intuitions explains why
courts and commentators strongly favor application of the DOE to laterdeveloped technology. Later-developed technology cases involve defendants
who avoid literal infringement by substituting an equivalent that did not exist at
the time the claims were drafted. For example, the DOE has been applied in
several cases to counteract the unforeseen effects of invention of the personal
212. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
213. Id. at 276–77; cf. TIROLE, supra note 203, at 402–03.
214. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 73; Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits
and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273
(1998).
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computer. Courts and commentators usually contend it is unfair to sacrifice
claim scope on account of surprising and unforeseen technological developments. Our refinement theory suggests the opposite policy is efficient.
The DOE should not apply to unforeseeable later-developed technology
because the benefit of centralized development is low, the cost of preemptive
refinement is low, the loss of incentive to invent is low, and the ex post gain
from imitation is high. Centralized development loses its value because the
inventor cannot coordinate development along a pathway that depends upon
unforeseen technology. Likewise, in the absence of the DOE, the inventor does
not waste resources trying to preempt an unforeseeable strategy of imitation.
Since entry is unforeseen and does not occur until the second period, the effect
on the incentive to invent is muted. Therefore, society, not the inventor, should
enjoy the windfall associated with the unforeseen development of an equivalent
technology.
C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Like any economic model, the model developed in this Article suppresses
important features of the environment. In this section we present our conjectures about how the model would be affected by relaxing various assumptions.
For example, we assumed that there was a single potential competitor. Suppose
instead, a number of firms could enter the market and possibly develop an
embodiment in F. This change would increase the motivation of the inventor to
engage in preemptive refinement as described in Proposition 3. Preemptive
refinement becomes more appealing in a regime without the DOE because
competition from multiple imitators drives profit below the duopoly profit
level.215 This observation suggests the social value of the DOE is higher in a
market with multiple potential competitors.
In contrast, if we relax the assumption that only one firm is capable of
creating the invention, then the social value of the DOE is probably lower. A
race to get a patent amplifies the incentive effect of a patent. Proposition 2
suggests the DOE creates social value because it induces inventors to make
inventions with relatively high invention and high refinement costs they would
not make absent the DOE. The incentive boost from the DOE is less needed
(from a social perspective) when potential inventors feel pressure to move
quickly to outrace their rivals.216
The model could also be generalized to address trade secret protection.
Clearly, weakening the DOE increases the incentive to choose trade secret
215. Furthermore, when there are multiple potential competitors with different development costs,
the credibility of entry as discussed in Proposition 1 is greater, in other words, as more competitors
appear, the probability grows that D ⱖ y for at least one of them.
216. Actually, this statement holds in a more realistic model with stochastic research. In our model
with deterministic research, if the sum of refinement and invention costs exceeds the value of a patent
when there is only one potential inventor, then it will certainly hold when there is more than one
potential inventor.
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rather than patent protection. In particular, trade secret protection gives inventors in a no DOE regime a chance to avoid high refinement costs. Consequently,
instead of imitation as described in Proposition 4, the outcome could be trade
secret protection with attendant social losses from lack of disclosure and greater
difficulty contracting for technology transfer.
There are two other features we would like to consider, but they pose
tractability problems too great for us to handle in this Article. First, uncertainty
and private information should play a role in the model. The notice function of
claim language matters because of uncertainty and private information. Critics
of the DOE contend the uncertainty created by the doctrine makes litigation
more likely and licensing less likely. Unfortunately, our model cannot evaluate
these concerns directly. Second, it would be interesting to add cumulative
innovation to the model. Merges and Nelson argue that the DOE must be
calibrated to promote optimal improvement as well as early stage invention.217
IV. POLICY APPLICATIONS
A. REISSUE PROCEEDINGS

Inventors can broaden patent claims through a reissue proceeding at the
Patent Office during the first two years after a patent grant.218 Patent law offers
little to explain why the DOE is necessary given reissue serves as a means of
expanding claim scope.219 The dissenters in Graver Tank concluded that patentees should be encouraged to invoke the reissue proceeding more often and use
the DOE sparingly,220 but experience has proven otherwise. Indeed, the reissue
proceeding, for all practical purposes, is in a state of desuetude.221 When
presented with the question of whether the DOE was in conflict with the
statutory reissue mechanism, the Supreme Court either ignored the argument or
expressly refused to address it;222 and, to our knowledge, the Federal Circuit
217. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 882.
218. See text accompanying notes 108–11.
219. See Janicke, supra note 107, at 42 (“Courts and practitioners are told that ‘the claims define the
invention,’ and that if a patentee has made a mistake and written the claims too narrowly or too broadly,
corrective procedures are available [through a reissue proceeding]. At the same time, however, they are
told that ‘insubstantial’ changes do not warrant going through the trouble of reissue and can be, in
effect, corrected in litigation by asserting the doctrine of equivalents . . . .”). In fact, as noted above,
there is significant anecdotal evidence suggesting that prosecutors viewed the DOE as a safety net for
prosecutorial mistakes. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 5, at 711.
220. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612–19 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
221. In 2001, although 166,000 patents issued, only 480 reissue patents were granted by the Patent
Office. U.S. Patent Statistics, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (last visited
Oct. 16, 2005).
222. In Graver Tank, the majority did not address the issue despite the dissent’s vigorous contention
that the common law DOE is improperly supplanting the role of reissue as set forth by Congress. See
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612–19 (Black, J., dissenting). And in Warner-Jenkinson, the Court expressly
refused to consider the issue, noting that the argument was made in Graver Tank and “failed to
command a majority.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 (1997).
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has not attended to the issue.
Within the current patent regime, the DOE offers inventors several advantages over reissue proceedings, but at a potentially high price from a social
welfare perspective. Reissue also has advantages for the inventor—it is a
relatively inexpensive, ex parte proceeding that allows for claim broadening;
but it is more socially attractive than the DOE. The main disadvantages to the
inventor are what also make reissue an attractive alternative to the DOE, namely
the statutory limit of two years on new claims that broaden the scope of
protection223 and the doctrine of intervening rights.224 This doctrine mitigates
potential problems related to notice that could arise when claims are broadened
post-issuance by excusing competitors who start to practice a technology before
the reissue patent is granted (i.e., before notice), such that the technology is
outside of the original claims, but covered by a reissue claim.225 Thus, reissue
has much to recommend it. As Justice Black wrote in his Graver Tank dissent,
reissue “adequately protects patentees from ‘fraud,’ ‘piracy,’ and ‘stealing,’”
[while] “also protect[ing] businessmen from retroactive infringement suits and
judicial expansion of a monopoly sphere beyond that which a patent expressly
authorizes.”226
Plausibly, one could argue for abolition of the DOE,227 but we think there is a
socially valuable role for both reissues and the DOE. In many cases, experience
commercializing a technology reveals mistakes in the patent and reduces the
cost of enumerating embodiments enabled by the invention. The two-year
window allows further claim refinement via reissue after the costs of refinement
have fallen, and the intervening rights doctrine assures that notice costs are not
too great. For pioneer inventions, which are often commercialized more slowly,
the DOE may be socially desirable because it avoids high-cost refinement that
might otherwise occur.228 Likewise, the DOE may be preferable when the
invention is in a field that is changing rapidly in a way that creates high
refinement costs because of the high cost of predicting imitative strategies that
might be used by competitors.

Relatedly, there was also a separation of power issue that was asserted by the dissent in Graver, 339
U.S. at 616 (Black, J., dissenting), but the issue was ignored by the majority. This issue relates to
whether an Article III court’s decision to broaden the scope of a patent is inconsistent with the primacy
of the PTO in issuing patents.
223. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the
claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.”).
224. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000) (setting forth intervening use rights).
225. See Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packaging Inc., 731 F.2d 818 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Seattle
Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packaging Inc., 756 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
226. See Graver, 339 U.S. at 615 (Black, J., dissenting).
227. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future
After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004).
228. A full exploration of the proper role of reissue proceedings in relation to the DOE would
analyze the proper time limit on broadening reissues, and whether the notice based constraints on the
two doctrines should be harmonized. In addition, one should pay attention to the procedural differences
between the two schemes.
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B. LATER-DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY

The DOE allows patent scope to grow over time as technology advances. In
particular, patent owners exert control over products and processes that incorporate technology developed after the patent issues, and thus do not literally
infringe. Expansion of scope is possible because equivalents are evaluated at the
time of infringement, not the time of invention, filing, or issuance.229
The possibility that competitors could skirt literal claim language by making
a minor modification based on later-developed technology generates ardent
support for the DOE.230 The leading case on this issue is Hughes Aircraft Co. v.

229. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (“Insofar as the
question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to claimed
element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency—and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements—is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.”). The policy
underlying measuring DOE infringement at time of infringement is that because of the cumulative and
unforeseeable nature of complex and ramified technologies, the patentee has opened doors for subsequent inventors, doors that perhaps were not foreseeable at the time the patentee filed for a patent, yet
was eventually made possible because of the patentee’s patent disclosure. In other words, the patentee
is not required to predict all future developments that enable the practice of his invention in substantially the same way. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 941 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (“It is clear that an equivalent can be found in technology known at the time of the invention, as
well as in subsequently developed technology.”); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal
Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The doctrine of equivalents is necessary because
one cannot predict the future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an invention may be
developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so insubstantial a change from
what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an infringement. Such a variant, based on
after-developed technology, could not have been disclosed in the patent.”); Janis, supra note 143, at 277
(claim language can expand over time and should be interpreted in light of evolving technology).
230. For example, the Warner-Jenkinson Court cited a portion of the United States amicus brief in
its discussion of prosecution history estoppel. Warner-Jenksnson, 520 U.S. at 31. The amicus brief, in
the cited portion, contains, in a footnote, an argument, and an example concerning later-developed
equivalents:
Of course, when an accused equivalent (meeting the objective standard of insubstantiality) could not
have been known because it was developed or discovered only after the patent issued, the case for
application of the doctrine of equivalents becomes especially clear. For example, a claim to a
chemical composition might include an inactive filler as a minor, unimportant ingredient. After the
patent issues, a competitor of the patentee might manufacture a composition exactly as claimed but
use a different, inactive filler, unknown in the art at the time the patent application was filed, that
performs exactly as those literally covered by the claim. Such a substitution, once it became
available, might be known to persons of skill in the relevant art to be interchangeable with the
claimed filler, and yet it would not have been possible to include the accused element in the patent
because it did not exist at the time of issue.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 23 n.7, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (No. 95-728), 1996 WL 172221; see also Conigliaro et al., supra note 116, at
1064 (“The application of the Festo rule to later-developed technology is particularly disturbing, since
in all likelihood the patentee had no intention of giving up ground that did not even exist at the time the
amendment was made.”). Certain judges and commentators believe that later-developed technology is
the only context justifying application of the DOE. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader J., concurring) (“The principle of
foreseeability . . . focuses on the correct inquiries to preserve expectations for patent holders.”);
Phillips, supra note 199, at 180–81 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents should be barred from reaching all
but later arising equivalents.”).
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United States.231 As discussed earlier,232 Hughes involved an invention that
controlled the position of a satellite in space. The patented invention required a
ground-based computer to perform certain computations. Technology advanced
after the patent issued, the defendant installed micro-electronic components
on-board the satellite, and thereby rendered certain ground-based computing
unnecessary. The fairness theory favors the DOE in cases like Hughes as a
means to justly reward the inventor.233 The friction theory favors the DOE
because the patent applicant could not predict developments in microelectronics and draft claim language to cover an unknown equivalent.234
We believe the rationale offered by Hughes is faulty, and generally patent
law’s treatment of foreseeability is misguided. Courts mistakenly favor the
patentee most strongly when the technology is least foreseeable. But unforeseeable technological developments do not justify application of the DOE, because
the doctrine will not save refinement costs or significantly improve the incentive
to invent in such cases.235 A patent applicant will not waste time refining claims
to cover equivalents she cannot foresee. The DOE provides a social benefit
when it diminishes the incentive for an inventor to invest in socially wasteful
claim refinement. For instance, a patent applicant who could never imagine the
use of graphite or lighter weight materials in tennis rackets will not waste
resources refining a claim to cover it. But a patent applicant who understands
that tennis racket composition is trending toward lighter, yet to be developed
materials, should not find it too difficult to write a claim that will cover
graphite, for instance.236 The cost of this sort of refinement seems low, and it
does not depend on whether a specific graphite or light weight composition was
foreseeable; rather, the important factor is a general, yet clear, appreciation of
industry and technology trends. In these cases, the DOE provides little social
benefit. The troubling case is the intermediate one where the applicant has a
vague sense of these trends, then absent the DOE, the applicant could expend

231. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The courts struggled with this case for over twenty years and
finally found infringement under the DOE.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 151–54.
233. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1365.
Advanced computers and digital communications techniques developed since Williams permit
doing on-board a part of what Williams taught as done on the ground. As one of our
predecessor courts, the Court of Claims, has thrice made clear, that partial variation in
technique, an embellishment made possible by post-Williams technology, does not allow the
accused spacecraft to escape the “web of infringement.”
Id.
234. See id. at 1362 (stating a patent applicant “is not required to predict all future developments
which enable the practice of his invention in substantially the same way”). It is far from certain that
Hughes could not have drafted claims literally covering on-board computers. See supra notes 153–154.
235. Cohen and Lemley argue that the DOE is too generous when applied to later-developed
software technology because the rapid pace of software innovation means a pioneer may control several
generations of subsequent technology. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 46 (2001).
236. See supra Part II.B.
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significant effort refining her claims to cover potential technological developments. The DOE provides the greatest refinement cost savings in this intermediate case, one with genuine but poorly understood trends.
Our second example, motivated by the fact pattern in Hughes, applies our
analysis to a case in which later-developed technology allows a single component to perform the function previously performed by separate components.
Suppose later developed technology allows the alleged infringer to perform
multiple functions with a single structure, in particular, suppose an invention
combines components a, b, and c, which perform three separate functions. Also,
suppose the claim describes a, b, and c, as three separate claim limitations.
Finally, suppose technology advances so that the two functions accomplished by
b and c can now be accomplished using d. An alleged infringer who combines a
and d might successfully argue that his technology does not read on the
limitations associated with b and c. Then, because of the all-elements rule, there
is no infringement literally or under the DOE. Thus, the all-elements rule
induces patent applicants to visualize advances in technology like d; refine their
claims to reduce the number of limitations; and craft the limitations so that they
cover d and similar substitutions. Our earlier discussion of Hughes suggests the
applicant in that case could have written claims broad enough to cover the
accused satellite even without knowing the details of how computer technology
would evolve.237 Once again, proper application of the DOE requires evaluation
of the refinement costs that likely would be spent to claim d. Courts have
discretion when applying the all-elements rule to favor patentees when expected
refinement costs are large and favor alleged infringers otherwise.238
Besides refinement cost savings, DOE policy must also be sensitive to
inventor profit and the incentive to invent. No doubt, restricting the DOE will
reduce incentives to some degree, but this hazard is probably overstated. First,
notice that when an inventor foresees a high probability of a particular future
substitute, the cost of claiming that substitute is probably low. Second, an
inventor’s incentive is not harmed much when, ex post, she is denied patent
scope over technology that she did not foresee ex ante. The real incentive
problem arises if an inventor believes there are many remote possible substitutes and the aggregate probability of some later developed substitute appearing
is high.239 There is no statistical evidence suggesting this is a serious problem,
and our impression from the case law and the history of technology is that few
inventors have much to fear.

237. See supra text accompanying notes 153–54.
238. The Federal Circuit held that claim limitations are not necessarily vitiated when multiple claim
limitations are combined into a single element in the accused device as long as the differences remain
insubstantial. See Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). For more discussion of the flexibility inherent in the all-elements rule, see infra text
accompanying notes 248–57.
239. It is also possible that incentives are seriously eroded by refinement efforts designed to capture
later developed technology.
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C. ALL-ELEMENTS RULE

Literal infringement requires every limitation in the claim be found in the
accused device.240 The same rule applies to infringement under the DOE; it is
known as the all-elements rule.241 Infringement under the DOE requires the
patentee show the accused product or process contains elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.242 Thus, the rule
prevents the DOE from vitiating a claim limitation.243
The all-elements rule is difficult to apply, but useful as a method for constraining the DOE and promoting the notice function of claims.244 All-elements is a
question of law giving judges the power to protect defendants from baseless
patent infringement claims by entering a summary judgment of non-infringe-

240. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
241. The Federal Circuit has expressed a preference for the word “limitation” (instead of “element”)
when referring to claim language, and “element” when referring to the accused device. See Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In our prior cases,
we have used both the term ‘element’ and the term ‘limitation’ to refer to words in a claim. It is
preferable to use the term ‘limitation’ when referring to claim language and the term ‘element’ when
referring to the accused device.” (citations omitted)). To this end, the court has also noted that the “All
Elements rule might better be called the All Limitations rule.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1317 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Philip M. Nelson, Definition for
‘Limitation’ in the Context of Prosecution History Estoppel and the All Elements Rule: A Proposed
Solution to the Troubling Dictum in Kustom Signals v. Applied Concepts, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 373
(arguing “all-limitations” is a better name than “all-elements” because the word element refers to both a
claim limitation and a component of a device).
242. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (“We concur
with this apt reconciliation of our two lines of precedent. Each element contained in a patent claim is
deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents
must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”); Pennwalt Corp.
v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935–36 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (adopting all-elements approach);
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Under the
all elements rule, there can be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents if even one limitation
of a claim or its equivalent is not present in the accused device.”).
243. See Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus,
if a court determines that a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents “‘would entirely
vitiate a particular claim[ed] element,’ then the court should rule that there is no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.” Bell Atlantic Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Festo, 234 F.3d at 587).
244. The constraining effect of the all-elements rule grows as the number of elements grows,
because the patentee must prove identity or equivalence to each element. Pioneer patents usually have
fewer limitations because there is less need for limitations that distinguish the invention from the prior
art. Also certain technologies require fewer limitations. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 235, at 44
(“The element-by-element approach . . . may not help in many software cases, where the softwarerelated part of the invention is often described in a single element.”); Antony L. Ryan & Roger G.
Brooks, Innovation vs. Evasion: Clarifying Patent Rights in Second-Generation Genes and Proteins, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1265, 1284–85 (2002) (“Some commentators suggest that each nucleotide in a
gene patent and each amino acid in a protein patent may constitute a separate claim element. But most
amino acids in any particular protein do not perform a known function of their own; rather, the amino
acid sequence as a whole determines the protein’s three-dimensional structure, which in turn is essential
to its function. Thus, it makes no sense to consider each amino acid to be a separate claim element.”).
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ment.245 Some commentators suggest the rule also increases clarity regarding
the scope of patent rights.246 Actually, the rule has mixed effects on clarity. On
one hand, it constrains the DOE and reduces that source of uncertainty. On the
other hand, it creates uncertainty about how a court will define the elements of a
claim.247
For example, in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc.,248 the Federal
Circuit used the all-elements rule to block application of the DOE to a patent
when the inventor faced low refinement costs. The invention was a container for
disposing of hazardous medical waste. The relevant claim language stated the
invention comprised a container body, “an elongated slot at the top of the
container body . . . .”249 The defendant made a similar container, but the slot for
disposing the waste was within the container body.250 Both containers featured
two constrictions that kept the waste securely within the container. The plaintiff
argued “having two constrictions below the top of the container is the same, for
purposes of infringement, as having one constriction above and one constriction
below.”251 The court found no literal infringement and ruled the all-elements
rule would be violated if the patentee were allowed to show the slot within the

245. Some have argued that invoking the equitable powers of the court and having the judge serve as
the DOE gatekeeper is preferable. See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 593 (Plager, J., concurring) (“A better
solution would be to declare the doctrine of equivalents—a judge-made rule in the first place—to have
its roots firmly in equity, and to acknowledge that when and in what circumstances it applies is a
question of equitable law, a question for which judges bear responsibility.”); Michel, supra note 1, at
125 (“The all-limitations rule . . . holds that no equivalent infringement exists as a matter of law, if the
allegedly infringing article lacks any claim limitation.”); Meurer, supra note 30, at 534–35.
246. See, e.g., Anand Gupta, Patent Law: The Supreme Court Reinforces the Validity of the Doctrine
of Equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 123, 138–39
(1998) (“By adopting the all-elements test, the Court has given importance to the public notice and
definitional functions of the patent laws. . . . Moreover, by requiring that each element in the patent
have an equivalent in the accused invention, the Court has limited the scope and application of the
doctrine of equivalents because fewer inventions should be found to infringe under this test than under
the ‘as a whole’ test.”).
247. See Phillips, supra note 199, at 162 (“The definition of an ‘element’ is slippery and probably
cannot be settled without some resort to arbitrariness. Presently, an element seems to be more than just
a single word, but potentially less than an entire step in a method or an entire constituent part of an
apparatus (as is typically demarcated by semicolons).”); Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc.,
264 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (conducting a DOE analysis and deciding that the word “or” is an
element).
In addition, the all-elements rule does not imply “a one-to-one correspondence between components
of the accused device and the claimed invention. An accused device may infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents even though a combination of its components performs a function performed by a single
element in the patented invention. The accused device must nevertheless contain every limitation or its
equivalent.” Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., Inc., 16 F.3d 394, 397–98 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted). “Equivalency thus can exist when two components of the accused device perform a
single function of the patented invention” or “when separate claim limitations are combined into a
single component of the accused device.” Id.
248. 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
249. Id. at 1422.
250. Id. at 1423.
251. Id. at 1424.
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container was equivalent to a slot at the top of the container.252 This appears to
be a case in which the applicant easily could have written claim language to
literally cover the defendant’s product, and the court appropriately used the
all-elements rule to deny the availability of the DOE.253
In contrast, the court treated a pioneer inventor generously when applying the
all-elements rule in Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc.254
Corning researchers invented glass optical fibers haled as pioneering because
they made fiber optic telephone transmission possible.255 The patented fiber has
a core of glass with a high refractive index surrounded by a glass coating with a
lower refractive index. The differential in refractivity kept laser light within the
core of the fiber. The claims called for a core of glass doped with titanium
surrounded by pure glass. The titanium caused the core to have a higher
refractive index than the outside coating. Sumitomo’s accused fiber achieved a
similar differential in refractivity by putting fluorine, a negative dopant, in the
coating rather than a positive dopant in the core.
The court upheld a verdict finding infringement under the DOE and ruled that
the all-elements rule was not violated.256 There was no literal infringement
because the accused product lacked a positive dopant. The defendant argued
that the positive dopant was an element missing from the defendant’s product,
and therefore, the all-elements rule was not satisfied. The court disagreed and
identified the differential in the refractive indices between the core and the
coating as the relevant limitation. It concluded that adding a negative dopant to

252. Id. (“Thus, for a patentee who has claimed an invention narrowly, there may not be infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in many cases, even though the patentee might have been able to
claim more broadly. If it were otherwise, then claims would be reduced to functional abstracts, devoid
of meaningful structural limitations on which the public could rely.”).
253. Id. at 1425 (“If Sage desired broad patent protection for any container that performed a function
similar to its claimed container, it could have sought claims with fewer structural encumbrances.”).
The refinement theory also aids literal infringement analysis by helping courts apply the all-elements
rule. Consideration of refinement costs can help courts choose the better of two competing claim
interpretations. The invention in Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991), was a
system of plastic pieces used to attach wall covering to a wall. The relevant claim language stated the
invention comprised: “linear border pieces and right angle corner border pieces . . . .” Id. at 1560. The
defendant made the same plastic pieces, except the defendant substituted a pair of trapezoidal pieces
with 45° cuts for a right-angled corner piece. Id. at 1561. The court ruled there was no literal
infringement because the defendant’s product lacked an element: a right angle corner piece. Id. at
1562–63. The court also refused to apply the DOE because the use of trapezoidal pieces to make the
corner is a different and more complicated way to attach wall covering. Id. at 1563–64. The dissent
would have found literal infringement by reading right-angled corner piece broadly enough to cover
two trapezoidal pieces joined in a corner. Id. at 1568. The dissent’s approach disregards the question of
why the inventor failed to claim trapezoidal pieces explicitly. The patentee would argue that its claim
language has at least two reasonable interpretations, and it intended the broader interpretation, therefore
it did not need to specify trapezoidal pieces explicitly. Patent law should not tolerate this prosecution
strategy; the costs of refining the claim to include the trapezoidal pieces would have been low.
254. 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Critics of Corning read this case as ignoring the all-elements
rule in favor of the holistic approach to the DOE.
255. Id. at 1254–55.
256. Id. at 1257–61.
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the coating is the same “way” of achieving the differential as adding a positive
dopant to the core.257 We approve of this outcome and comment more on this
case below in our discussion of pioneer inventions.
D. PIONEER INVENTIONS

Patent law rewards inventors of pioneer inventions with broader protection.258 The reward flows from two sources: the grant of broad patent claims,
and generous application of the DOE.259 Courts often conflate analysis of these
distinct sources of reward.260 The two versions of the pioneer invention doctrine
are related, but patent law can be improved by disentangling them and conducting a separate normative analysis.
Pioneer inventions get broad patent scope on the theory they have a high

257. Id. at 1259 (“Sumitomo’s analysis illustrates the confusion sometimes encountered because of
misunderstanding or misleading uses of the term ‘element’ in discussing claims. ‘Element’ may be used
to mean a single limitation, but it has also been used to mean a series of limitations which, taken
together, make up a component of the claimed invention. In the All Elements rule, ‘element’ is used in
the sense of a limitation of a claim . . . . An equivalent must be found for every limitation of the claim
somewhere in an accused device, but not necessarily in a corresponding component, although that is
generally the case.”).
258. Pioneer status is determined by asking whether an invention makes a significant technological
advance in the field. See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561–62 (1898) (“To
what liberality of construction these claims are entitled depends, to a certain extent, upon the character
of the invention, and whether it is what is termed, in ordinary parlance, a ‘pioneer.’ This word, although
used somewhat loosely, is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function never before
performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in
the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone
before.”); Universal Gym Equip. Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (rejecting contention that invention was a pioneer entitled to a broad range of equivalents);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same).
259. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade ComM⬘n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (“To achieve this purpose, equivalency is judicially determined by reviewing the content of
the patent, the prior art, and the accused device, and essentially redefining the scope of the claims. This
constitutes a deviation from the need of the public to know the precise legal limits of patent protection
without recourse to judicial ruling. For the occasional pioneering invention, devoid of significant prior
art—as in the case before us—whose boundaries probe the policy behind the law, there are no
immutable rules.”). The DOE applies in proportion to the advance by the inventor. See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997) (“[J]udicial recognition of
so-called ‘pioneer’ patents suggests that the abandonment of ‘central’ claiming may be overstated. That
a claim describing a limited improvement in a crowded field will have a limited range of permissible
equivalents does not negate the availability of the doctrine vel non.”); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip.
Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The concept of the ‘pioneer’ arises from an ancient
jurisprudence, reflecting judicial appreciation that a broad breakthrough invention merits a broader
scope of equivalents than does a narrow improvement in a crowded technology. But the ‘pioneer’ is not
a separate class of invention, carrying a unique body of law. The wide range of technological advance
between pioneering breakthrough and modest improvement accommodates gradations in scope of
equivalency.”).
260. See, e.g., Brothers v. United States, 250 U.S. 88, 89 (1919) (“No question is made but that
plaintiff’s invention was broadly new, a pioneer in its line, and the patent entitled to a broad
construction and the claims to a liberal application of the doctrine of equivalents.”).
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social value and therefore require strong patent-based incentives.261 Broad
claims are available to pioneers because they are less constrained by prior art,262
and because they can make impressive disclosures that enable new fields of
technology.263 Merges and Nelson caution against over-rewarding pioneers,
however, lest cumulative innovation be discouraged because improvers have too
little incentive and pioneers have too much control.264
Despite a solid theoretical basis for giving pioneers generous protection
against literal infringement, it is not immediately clear that the high social value
of pioneer inventions justifies special treatment under the DOE.265 If not for
frictions, pioneers could get appropriately broad scope by relying on the claim
language in their patents. In the absence of frictions that constrain claim scope,
more generous treatment of pioneers under the DOE would over-reward pioneers and possibly stifle cumulative innovation.266 Hence, the only persuasive

261. See Thomas, supra note 202, at 58–59 (pioneer inventors should get a bigger reward); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics Of Improvement In Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1073
(1997) (pioneers should get broad claim scope).
262. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Without extensive prior art to confine and cabin their claims, pioneers acquire broader claims than
non-pioneers who must craft narrow claims to evade the strictures of a crowded art field. Thus, claim
scope itself generally supplies broader exclusive entitlements to the pioneer.”); Abbott Labs. v. Dey,
L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“A pioneer patent by definition will have little applicable
prior art to limit it, whereas an improvement patent’s scope is confined by the existing knowledge on
which the improvement is based.”).
263. Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 848–49.
264. Id. at 843–44 (“In many industries the efficiency gains from the pioneer’s ability to coordinate
are likely to be outweighed by the loss of competition for improvements to the basic invention.”). Their
work influenced many commentators who argue that the enablement standard, the experimental use
doctrine, or the DOE should be used to fine-tune patent protection to pioneers vis-à-vis improvers. See
Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 188–89 (2002) (upstream
patents on pioneering inventions slow progress because they slow improvements).
Broad patent protection may inhibit the rate of technological improvement in industries characterized
by cumulative invention. Most commentators assume that multiple research teams are more productive
than a single research team with the same resources. They also assume that a single firm cannot
coordinate multiple research teams as effectively as when those teams are independent. See James
Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation (MIT Dep’t of Economics,
Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000). For a discussion of the optimal allocation of rights between pioneers
and inventors, see Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26
RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995); Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995).
265. Jay Thomas shares our skepticism. See Thomas, supra note 202, at 52 (“The courts have
offered little justification for the application of pioneer invention doctrine.”).
266. But see In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“To restrict [a patentee] to the . . .
form disclosed . . . would be a poor way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early
disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad protection for pioneer
inventions, a policy both shortsighted and unsound from the standpoint of promoting progress in the
useful arts, the constitutional purpose of the patent laws.”); Conigliaro et al., supra note 116, at 1059
(“In sum, enforcing the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel in a manner that
balances patents’ protective and notice functions is the optimal means of promoting the progress of the
useful arts. Only through a careful balance of these functions will the law encourage innovation by both
pioneering inventors and technological improvers.”). The Federal Circuit has since retreated from
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argument courts or commentators have offered for special treatment of pioneer
inventions under the DOE is that pioneer inventors face greater frictions than
other inventors.267
The friction based defense of broader protection of pioneers under the DOE
clashes with our central objection to the friction theory—there is little evidence
that the frictions are really greater for pioneer inventions. In fact, claims to
pioneer inventions may be easier to draft because a pioneer applicant has less
difficulty drafting around the prior art, less need to amend, and therefore less
reason to worry about PHE.268 Nevertheless, we think the case law is on the
right track. Not surprisingly, we suggest that refinement costs, rather than
frictions, may be larger for pioneers. In particular, we conjecture that many
pioneer inventors face a tougher problem of visualizing and enumerating the
many possible methods of imitating a pioneer invention.269

Hogan and its rhetoric on pioneer patents. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315
F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating Hogan’s statement that pioneer inventions deserve broad
claims is “unconvincing” and “extended dicta”).
267. See Thomas, supra note 202, at 52 (noting courts rely on what we characterize as the friction
theory to justify the pioneer invention doctrine within the DOE). Specifically, courts and commentators
suggest that the limitations of language are more troubling for pioneers than for other inventors, or that
pioneers are more troubled by later developed technology. See Moore v. United States, 211 U.S.P.Q.
800, 806 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“The doctrine finds its roots in the judicial recognition that drafting the
disclosure and claims for a pioneer patent is a difficult task because of the new scientific ground being
broken by the unique invention.”); Faith S. Fillman, Doctrine of Equivalents: Is Festo the Right
Decision for the Biomedical Industry?, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 493, 529 (2002) (“Future variations are
difficult to predict and claim in written form, but since they come so rapidly, minor variations rob
patents of their value. Biotechnology’s generic claims are often narrowed based on strict disclosure
requirements of the PTO, which places the pioneer inventor in a losing situation.”); Anthony H. Azure,
Festo’s Effect on After-Arising Technology and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1153,
1181 (2001) (“Thus, under Festo, an inventor who needs to make a narrowing amendment due to the
inherent difficulty of drafting claims for pioneering inventions may not be able to use the doctrine of
equivalents in future litigation. Festo’s bright-line rule unfairly restricts the rights of pioneer inventors
to literal infringement only.”); Lichtman, supra note 27, at 176 (suggesting language frictions are
greater for “complicated or rapidly evolving technologies”). But it should be noted that the Federal
Circuit has suggested that an enabling disclosure is more important when nascent technology is at issue
“because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from the patentee’s
instruction.” Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc. 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Genentech,
Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Where, as here, the claimed
invention is an application of an unpredictable technology in the early stages of development an
enabling description in the specification must provide those skilled in the art with a specific and useful
teaching.”). Thus, the court does not appear to be sympathetic to the claim that pioneers have greater
linguistic obstacles to overcome.
268. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[A] pioneer generally need not fear traditional limits on the application of the doctrine of equivalents
such as prior art or prosecution history estoppel (because amendments or arguments to overcome the
prior art are generally unnecessary in true pioneer applications) . . . .”); Thomas, supra note 202, at
56–57 (noting that with respect to claim drafting, pioneer inventions compare favorably with inventions
with crowded prior art, and pioneer inventions are less likely to be subject to prosecution history
estoppel in subsequent litigation).
269. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley favor a rejuvenated pioneer doctrine for biotech inventions, see
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691
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The case of Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc.270
illustrates a case in which a pioneer inventor failed to visualize and claim the
competitor’s imitative technology. Recall that the invention comprised glass
fiber with a doped core, and that the imitator made a glass fiber with a doped
cladding. Either approach achieved the same difference in the refractive indices
between the cladding and the core which was the key to the invention. Although
it is hard to be sure, we see this as a case of intermediate foreseeability in which
it would have been difficult for Corning to visualize and literally claim Sumitomo’s imitative fiber,271 thus refinement costs would have been high.272 Application of the DOE in this case offers two possible social benefits: avoidance of
costly refinement expenditures, and a valuable incentive boost that encourages
pioneering invention.273
E. PUBLIC DEDICATION RULE

The public dedication rule is the latest effort of the Federal Circuit to
constrain the DOE. This rule holds that a patent drafter dedicates to the public
disclosed, but unclaimed subject matter.274 For example, in Moore U.S.A., Inc.
v. Standard Register Co.,275 the patent covered an envelope that can be manipulated to make a return envelope. The claim language described adhesive strips
extending the majority of the length of two strips on the margins of the
envelope. The defendant’s envelope was similar to the claimed envelopes but
(2004), because of the difficulty claiming the “numerous functional equivalents of particular DNA
sequences.” Id. at 53.
270. 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
271. A clever method of imitating a pioneering invention, like Sumitomo’s method, can be patented
in its own right.
272. See discussion in Part IV.B., supra. We assume that refinement costs would be relatively high in
this case and relatively low in Hughes. Certainly we could be wrong about both cases, but the
resolution of these factual questions is separate from the analytic structure we provide for application of
the DOE. We distinguish these cases on two grounds. First, the Corning invention was pioneering, and
second, the accused device in Hughes functioned in the same way as the claimed technology.
273. Another example of a pioneer inventor who likely faced high refinement costs is provided by
International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The inventor
patented a cast iron alloy containing magnesium which improved the quality of the cast iron.
Magnesium added to cast iron does two things: (1) reacts with sulfur, and (2) makes graphite form
spheres instead of flakes. The inventor discovered property (2), which makes cast iron more like steel.
The relevant claim 1 called for about 0.04% as the minimum quantity of retained magnesium. The
accused product had about 0.02% magnesium. Interestingly, this case is NOT a close analogue of
Warner-Jenkinson. The minimum quantity in claim 1 is required for “normal” iron. The defendant
cleaned the sulfur out of their iron, and then used the patented technology with less magnesium—
enough to accomplish function (2) when function (1) was accomplished in advance. The magnesium
that cleans up the sulfur in normal iron is not available to make graphite spheres.
274. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc);
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1106–07 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The panel in YBM Magnex, Inc. v.
ITC, 145 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1998), warns that this strong version of the dedication rule is
inconsistent with Warner-Jenkinson and Graver Tank: “The Supreme Court’s guidance in WarnerJenkinson and Graver Tank does not permit the blanket rule that everything disclosed but not claimed is
barred from access to the doctrine of equivalents, whatever the facts, circumstances, and evidence.”
275. 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the adhesive strips extended only a minority of the length of the margins. The
patentee was denied a chance to apply the DOE to this claim element because it
disclosed but did not claim adhesive strips that extended a minority of the
length of the margin.276
The dedication rule makes sense under the refinement theory, and it is hard to
dispute on fairness or friction grounds. The cost of drafting a claim to cover
material the inventor has already described in the specification must be quite
low. Mistake by the prosecutor serves as the most plausible reason to oppose the
rule. But mistake is not a very appealing argument given that the reissue
proceeding provides an opportunity for the patent owner to correct the mistake
and broaden the claim language during the first two years after the patent
issues.277 As the notice theory emphasizes, it is socially desirable that competitors can rely on disclosed and unclaimed embodiments described in a patent as a
safe harbor.278

276. Id. at 1107 (“Having fully disclosed two distinct embodiments, one in which the first and
second longitudinal strips extend a majority of the length of the longitudinal marginal portions, and one
in which they do not, Moore is not entitled to ‘enforce the unclaimed embodiment as an equivalent of
the one that was claimed.’”).
277. Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1055 (“A patentee who inadvertently fails to claim disclosed
subject matter, however, is not left without remedy. Within two years from the grant of the original
patent, a patentee may file a reissue application and attempt to enlarge the scope of the original claims
to include the disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). In addition, a
patentee can file a separate application claiming the disclosed subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 120
(2000) (allowing filing as a continuation application if filed before all applications in the chain issue).
Notably, Johnston took advantage of the latter of the two options by filing two continuation applications
that literally claim the relevant subject matter.”).
278. See Ashita Doshi, Johnson & Johnston Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 209, 226 (2003) (“Johnson’s strict application of the dedication rule places a burden on the
patentee to literally claim all disclosed subject matter, or surrender the right to exclude the public from
it. Johnson thus ensures that patent claims, and not the specification, give the PTO and the public
adequate notice of an invention’s scope. The primary benefits of a strict application of the dedication
rule are increased predictability of outcomes and certainty in determining an invention’s scope.”). But
see Thomas R. Hipkins, A Rebuttable Presumption of Dedication: Protecting the Hard-Luck Patentee
from Johnson & Johnston’s Dedication Rule, 87 MINN. L. REV. 779, 799 (2003) (“The Johnson &
Johnston dedication rule purports to bolster the notice function by drawing a bright line, eliminating
any zone of uncertainty. In some cases, however, the line is not nearly so bright as the Johnson &
Johnston court would like to believe. The nature of language makes it impossible to eliminate all
uncertainty from the scope of patent claims.”).
Lichtman argues that the minor friction in a case like Johnson & Johnston implies that notice cost is
also small. Lichtman, supra note 27, at 177. Arguably, notice costs are small if a competitor is on notice
that unclaimed embodiments can be captured through the DOE, because a competitor can read the
specification and spot such embodiments. In a sense, this argument and the argument in YBM can be
used to support a return to peripheral rather than central claiming. We oppose movement in that
direction because we do not believe refinement and notice costs fall symmetrically on patentees and
potential infringers. An inventor should not be allowed to intentionally claim narrowly and avoid
enablement and prior art reviews of broader claims by the PTO with the hope of gaining broad
coverage through the DOE at trial. Potential infringers are usually poorly positioned compared to the
inventor to judge whether an embodiment would be blocked by enablement or prior arts constraints.
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F. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL

Prosecution history, the public record of the “negotiation” between a patent
applicant and the patent examiner, affects patent scope in two ways. First, it aids
claim interpretation analogously to the way legislative history aids statutory
interpretation.279 Information in the prosecution history can be used to support
either a broad or narrow interpretation of a patent claim.280 Second, it limits
scope by constraining use of the DOE. If the prosecution history reveals that a
patent owner disclaimed certain embodiments during the application process,
then she is estopped from recovering those embodiments at trial through
application of the DOE.281
Typically, estoppel applies when the patent applicant narrows a claim in
response to an examiner’s contention that the original claim is not enabled or is
unpatentable in view of the prior art.282 Patent law equates this claim revision
with an admission that the broader claim is unpatentable, and therefore, the
DOE cannot properly extend scope to cover subject matter that was given up by
amendment. The long-running controversy regarding PHE concerns the rigor of
this policy.
We can illustrate the impact of PHE by supposing the patent applicant
originally filed a broad claim to the embodiments contained in sets E and F, and
then amended the claim by deleting set F. Estoppel bars use of the DOE to
extend the patent scope to cover the embodiments contained in F. This narrow
version of estoppel is not controversial. Controversy arises when the defendant
makes an embodiment, x, that is not contained in sets E or F, but is arguably
equivalent to the embodiments in E. Proponents of a strong DOE favor a
flexible approach that gives courts discretion to apply the DOE to embodiments

279. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (comparing
prosecution history to legislative history). The PTO makes the prosecution history public after a patent
issues. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2005).
280. Claim interpretation is a relatively formal process. If a claim is clear on its face, then its
meaning cannot be altered by the prosecution history, or information from any other source. See
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967). If the claim is ambiguous, then
various sources including the prosecution history may be consulted. The Federal Circuit established a
hierarchy of interpretative sources favoring prosecution history, the patent specification, and drawings
over extrinsic sources. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Recently, the court has backed away from a strict hierarchy, and acknowledged that it may be
difficult to evaluate the clarity of claims in isolation. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
281. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–34 (2002); see
also Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Conigliaro et al., supra note 116, at
1064–65 (“The concept of prosecution history estoppel is based on the equitable concept of an implied
promise. The patentee is agreeing to narrow the scope of her claims in exchange for the grant of a
patent, and should not be permitted to avoid that agreement by later claiming to own what she
abandoned during prosecution.”).
282. A narrowing argument may also lead to estoppel. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d
1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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like x that the patentee did not specifically cede during prosecution.283 In Festo,
the Federal Circuit rejected flexibility in favor of a bright line, absolute bar.284
The “paramount” importance of the notice function of claims and the “need for
certainty” were the driving policy considerations underlying the absolute bar.285
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and chose a compromise
between the absolute and flexible bars.286 The Supreme Court created a rebuttable presumption barring application of the DOE. A “decision [by a patent
applicant] to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a
general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended
claim.”287 But the Court provided means by which the patentee can successfully
rebut the presumption, the most significant being the unforeseeability of the
alleged equivalent in question. In discussing the relationship between the DOE
and PHE, the Court stated that “[t]here is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of
the amendment.”288 The foreseeability concept is straightforward: estoppel does
not apply to subject matter a reasonable applicant could not foresee she had
given up at the time of application. Continuing our example, estoppel does not
apply if x is not foreseeable in light of the embodiments in E or F.289
Our refinement theory suggests that the Supreme Court chose a sensible
compromise, but PHE is better understood in terms of the refinement cost of
drafting claims rather than foreseeability.290 Prosecution history is relevant to

283. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 624 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Bemoaning the Federal Circuit’s adoption of
an absolute bar, Judge Linn wrote:
In my opinion, the majority’s new bright line rule eliminating all flexibility in the scope of
claim limitations amended for a statutory purpose reflects an unjustified faith in the draftsperson to select language to perfectly describe a new and unobvious invention at an early stage of
the development process. The same limitations of language noted in selecting words to
describe an invention in the first instance are no less present in selecting words to avoid an
examiner’s rejection of that original language for one statutory reason or another.
Id.
284. Id. at 574–75.
285. Id. at 575; see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 165, 218–20 (arguing that prosecution history
estoppel encourages clear claim drafting that minimizes problems arising from the limitations of
language).
286. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. But see Wagner, supra note 8, at 231 (“A close examination of the
Court’s presumptive bar reveals that it . . . is little different from the pre-Festo Federal Circuit
doctrine.”).
287. 535 U.S. at 740.
288. Id. at 738.
289. Under the absolute bar, if x differs from the embodiments in E, in terms of a limitation that
distinguished F from E, then the DOE is barred. Many commentators exaggerate the effect of the
absolute bar by stating it nullifies the DOE for amended claims. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 186–87
(arguing that the likely impact of an absolute bar has been greatly exaggerated). But see Jenny B. Davis,
Facing Up to Festo, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 30 (2002) (quoting Donald R. Dunner, a prominent patent
lawyer, who says the foreseeability test forecloses the DOE in 95% of cases).
290. See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes. In addition to a foreseeability test, the Supreme
Court stated that the presumption of estoppel can be overcome if “the rationale underlying the
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the DOE because it provides information about refinement costs and that
information should be used to optimally constrain the DOE. Even though the
Supreme Court emphasized foreseeability, the details of its argument are consistent with a refinement cost approach. The Court observed: “The patentee must
show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent.”291 And the “respondents may well prevail, for the sealing rings and the composition of the sleeve both were noted
expressly in the prosecution history.”292 Thus, the Court recognized that the
prosecution history shows Festo’s patent attorney was conscious of possible
equivalents to the sealing rings and the sleeve, and easily could have drafted a
claim that would read on SMC’s device, assuming Festo was entitled to such a
claim. The failure to draft a broader claim cannot be explained by some friction,
and recourse to the DOE should be denied.293
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents has an important role to play in our patent
system, but it has suffered from normative neglect by patent law theorists. The
original equitable justification for the doctrine, while having intuitive appeal, is
not sufficiently attentive to the notice function of patent claims and is inconsistent with patent law’s utilitarian grounding. Thus, while some courts to this day
embrace the fairness theory, another rationale, the friction theory, has evolved
that provides a more concrete justification for the DOE. The friction theory
offers various explanations of why an inventor fails to obtain the full breadth of
rights she was entitled to during patent prosecution, such as limitations of
language, prosecutorial mistakes, and later developed technology. The friction
theory fails us because it is implausible on empirical grounds; it fails to explain
why other doctrinal avenues, such as reissue, are inadequate; and, like the
fairness theory, it pays insufficient attention to patent law’s notice requirement.
In short, both the fairness and friction theories fail to provide a persuasive
normative justification for applying the DOE.
On the other hand, our refinement theory offers a compelling description of

amendment . . . bear[s] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or . . . [if there
is] some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described
the insubstantial substitute in question.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 740–41 (2002). These alternative grounds for rebutting estoppel are clearly motivated by
concern about refinement cost.
291. Id. at 741.
292. Id.
293. Greater certainty about patent scope comes at a price—diminished incentive to invent. Obviously, any constraint on the DOE reduces the expected scope and value of patent claims. Less
obviously, PHE creates noise that diminishes the value of a patent to risk averse inventors. Lichtman
produced empirical evidence making this point. He shows the probability of claim amendment
correlates with the identity of the examiner, and thus the risk of PHE correlates with examiner identity.
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 165–67 (2004).
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patent claiming and a social welfare justification of the DOE. We posit that
inventors fail to obtain the full claim breadth they are entitled to when they have
not sufficiently refined their claims during patent prosecution to capture equivalent technology. According to the refinement theory, the DOE creates a social
benefit by allowing patent applicants to avoid certain refinement costs during
patent prosecution. The theory also reveals the limits that should be imposed on
the doctrine. A socially optimal patent policy should balance refinement cost
savings and innovative incentives created by the DOE against the harm to
competition and rent-seeking costs created by the doctrine.
APPENDIX
This appendix explains the derivation of the equilibrium outcomes depicted
in Figure 1, and then justifies Propositions 1 through 6. In the first stage the
potential inventor, called firm 1, decides whether to invest w to obtain E, a
patentable embodiment of the invention.294 Firm 1 also decides in the first stage
whether to make an additional investment of x to refine the invention and obtain
the embodiment F. To keep the model as simple as possible, we suppose that F
can only be obtained after E. If firm 1 obtains E but not F, then the game moves
to stage two. The game ends after stage one if firm 1 makes no investment, or if
firm 1 obtains both E and F. In the second stage the potential competitor, called
firm 2, decides whether to invest y to develop F.295
Patent law is incorporated into the model by comparing the outcomes of the
game with and without our stylized version of the DOE. Under the DOE firm 1
can exclude firm 2 from making E or F after firm 1 claims E in a patent. The
DOE expands the scope of firm 1’s claim to cover F. In contrast, in the game
without the DOE firm 1 must claim F before it gets patent protection over it.
Equilibrium behavior under the DOE is easy to derive. If firm 1 does not
make the initial investment w, then there is no invention, no technology to
exploit, and firm 1 makes a profit of zero.

 1 共⭋兲 ⫽ 0.

(1)

If firm 1 invests w to obtain E and neither firm has access to F, then firm 1 gets
the profit from a single product monopoly (denoted M1). Profit for firm 1 is:

 1 (E) ⫽ M1 ⫺ w.

(2)

If firm 1 invests w and x, then it obtains both embodiments E and F, and gets the
profit from a two product monopoly (denoted M2). Thus, profit for firm 1 is:
294. For ease of exposition, we will treat E and F as single embodiments instead of sets of
embodiments. This choice of language does not affect the validity of our analysis for the case when E
and F are sets of embodiments.
295. We assume that firm 2 cannot “invent,” i.e., obtain embodiment E before firm 1.
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 1 (EF) ⫽ M2 ⫺ w ⫺ x.

(3)

Under the DOE firm 1 simply chooses the strategy that maximizes the profit
given by the expressions in (1) through (3). Invention and refinement yields the
highest profit if x ⱕ M2 ⫺ M1 and x ⱕ M2 ⫺ w. These inequalities bound the
efficient refinement region in Figure 1. Invention and no refinement yields the
highest profit if x ⱖ M2 ⫺ M1 and w ⱕ M1. These inequalities bound the
rectangle in Figure 1 made up of imitation, preemptive refinement and pioneer
inventions. The remaining case matches the no invention region in Figure 1.
In the regime with no DOE, profit expressions (1) and (3) still apply if firm 1
chooses not to invent, or to invent and refine. The other possibility is that firm
invents and allows firm 2 to imitate. In this case profit to firm 1 is:

 1 (imitation) ⫽ D ⫺ w.

(4)

Recall that imitation is not profitable to firm 2 and will not occur unless D ⱖ y.
Assuming this condition holds, then firm 1 chooses the strategy that maximizes
the profit given by expressions (1), (3), and (4). Invention and refinement yields
the highest profit if x ⱕ M2 ⫺ D and x ⱕ M2 ⫺ w. These inequalities bound the
preemptive and efficient refinement regions in Figure 1. Invention and imitation
yields the highest profit if x ⱖ M2 ⫺ D and w ⱕ D. These inequalities bound the
imitation region in Figure 1. The remaining case corresponds to the pioneer
invention and no invention regions in Figure 1. Notice that M1 ⱖ D, thus M2 ⫺
D ⱖ M2 ⫺ M1, and the DOE and no DOE regions in Figure 1 are located
correctly relative to each other.
After characterizing the equilibrium outcomes, proof of the propositions
follows rather easily. Proposition 1 observes that the DOE and no DOE are
equivalent when y ⬍ D because firm 2 does not pose a credible threat of entry.
If D ⱖ y and (3) is larger than (1) or (2), then invention and refinement occurs
regardless of whether the DOE is available. Recall refinement is efficient under
the DOE when refinement costs are sufficiently small, i.e., x ⱕ M2 ⫺ M1 and
x ⱕ M2 ⫺ w.
Proposition 2 indicates that the DOE boosts the incentive to invent. In the
region labeled pioneer invention in Figure 1, invention is profitable under the
DOE because (2) is greater than zero. But invention is not profitable under no
DOE because (3) and (4) are both less than zero. Therefore, DOE leads to
invention when the sum of invention and refinement costs is relatively high (in
the pioneer region) and no DOE leads to no invention.
Proposition 3 reflects the outcomes in the region labeled preemptive refinement in Figure 1. Under the DOE, firm 1 avoids refinement because the benefit
in terms of access to a greater range of technology is not worth the cost, i.e.,
x ⱖ M2 ⫺ M1. Under no DOE, firm 1 refines to preempt entry which is
profitable because x ⱕ M2 ⫺ D.
Proposition 4 reflects the outcomes in the region labeled imitation in Figure
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1. The model is designed with a strong DOE such that imitation never occurs
under the doctrine. In contrast, imitation occurs under no DOE in the imitation
region where refinement costs are especially high.
Propositions 5 and 6 emerge from a three-stage model. The third stage offers
firms 1 and 2 a chance to develop F at a later date, perhaps when development
is easier because of technological advances. There are a variety of plausible
ways to set up the three-stage model. Here we simply sketch an approach and
suggest how to prove Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 5 can be demonstrated by assuming the parameter values fall into
the preemptive refinement region in Figure 1. Thus, in the two-stage model,
firm 1 does not refine under the DOE. Shifting to the three-stage model, suppose
that firm 1 expects refinement costs to fall significantly over time, and firm 1
invents E and waits until the third stage to develop F. Firm 1 would enjoy the
single-product monopoly profit for a period of time and then later enjoy the
two-product monopoly profit. Let firm 1’s profit from use of the technology
equal M⬘ where M2 ⱖ M⬘ ⱖ M1, and let x⬘ ⬍ x be the expected cost of delayed
refinement. The profit under the DOE from delayed refinement is:

 1 (delay) ⫽ M⬘ ⫺ w ⫺ x⬘.

(5)

Firm 1 would not delay refinement in the absence of the DOE because firm 2
could enter the market either during stage two or stage three. Therefore, we
have firm 1 profiting from delayed refinement under the DOE, assuming (5) is
greater than (2), and firm 1 choosing early refinement and getting a profit of (3)
under no DOE. The profit expression in (5) is greater than (2) if the refinement
cost falls enough over time.
Proposition 6 can be demonstrated by assuming refinement and development
costs are high so that firm 2 cannot profitably enter, and firm 1 has no interest in
refinement. Unforeseeable later-developed technology can be modeled such that
refinement cost will probably remain constant but could fall substantially with a
small probability. Given the assumption of high initial refinement cost, firm 1
expects to make the profit given in (2). Making an adjustment for unforeseeable
later-developed technology would raise the expected profit of firm 1 by a small
amount under the DOE, and reduce it by a small amount if there is no DOE.
Application of the DOE in this case is not warranted because the impact on the
incentive to invent is small, and the ex post social gain from imitation could be
large.

